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ABSTRACT
Varner, Gary M. Ph.D. Purdue University, December 2015. The World Become Image:
Nonrepresentational Discussions of Film and the Natural World. Major Professors:
Arkady Plotnitsky, Lance Duerfahrd.
This dissertation investigates the relationships between film and the natural world.
Building upon extant work in the burgeoning field of Ecocinema, this project attempts to
move beyond the scholarly work on Ecocinema that satisfies itself with questions of
representation. The issues and arguments taken up here tend to be more programmatic.
This work is interested in ecological exchanges, encounters, and relationships, not
representations. The first chapter introduces the project, its origins, and the philosophical
motivations for working outside the mode of representation. The second chapter
excavates a concern for animals and the environment within the margins and subtext of
classical film theory, arguing that from the outset, scholars have built their understanding
of film at least partly around its relation to the natural world. The third chapter examines
closely Godfrey Reggio’s experimental documentary film Koyaanisqatsi in the context of
looming ecological disaster, Posthumanism, and an increasingly militarized civilian
population. Chapter four turns its attention onto the photography of Henri CartierBresson and animals. This chapter takes up Jacques Derrida’s challenge in The Animal
that Therefore I Am to open the question of animals and pathos in a way that is not itself
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pathetic. The final chapter of this dissertation challenges critical consensus regarding the
status of cinema in the work of Thomas Pynchon. This chapter argues that Gravity’s
Rainbow, Inherent Vice, and Paul Thomas Anderson’s film adaptation of the novel,
configure the cinema as a media ecology.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The seeds of this project began to sprout during the fall of my second year while
taking a course on documentary film and photography. One of the assignments for that
class required students to sit alone in the library with a few books of Henri-CartierBresson’s collected photographs. Looking through the oversized books, whose pages
were glossy, and heavy enough to suggest Importance, I discovered Cartier-Bresson’s
photograph of pigs in stalls, taken on a Dutch farm in 1953. This is not his most famous
photograph; it is not likely to turn up on museum postcards, or grace the cover of a
journal. But the pigs resonated with me for reasons that continue to evolve. At the time, I
simply loved animals. I gave up eating them a decade before I saw Cartier-Bresson’s
photo, I grew up around all kinds of dogs, and I knew that in some way, I wanted them to
be a part of my scholarly work.
In addition to the documentary film and photography course, I was also enrolled
in a course on Ecocriticism. And this course pollinated my love for Cartier-Bresson’s
photography. Tubers were sent out as I considered the ideas and texts of this course. And
for this seminar’s long paper, I began to think through how I could combine a scholarly
interest in both film and the environment. As I continued to finish up my coursework, one
of the last courses I took helped me think about how disparate pursuits or areas of
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humanities scholarship can come together and respond to one another. The course
addressed literature, philosophy, ethics, and politics; the multi-disciplinary approach of
this class encouraged me to think about working and writing without concern for
conventional academic boundaries.
Among the key figures for me in this project are some of the touchstones of
postmodern French philosophy: Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, and Jacques Derrida.
Somewhat counter-intuitively, I work more with Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts from A
Thousand Plateaus than I do with Deleuze’s two books on cinema. Partly this is because
Deleuze describes his task in Cinema 1: The Time Image as creating “a taxonomy, an
attempt at the classification of images and signs” (xxiv). Engaging as Deleuze’s two
books on cinema are, they are not often or entirely helpful to my own goals—which are
to chart and explore various relationships and encounters with images, structured by a
few areas of environmental study within the humanities. As for my work with Derrida,
part of this project’s overall aims are to answer some of the problems posed by The
Animal that Therefore I Am. Derrida’s question, for example, of how to approach pathos
where animals are concerned in a way that is not “pathetic” (26) is for me a very
important one because it points toward animals’ relation not only to images but also to
politics.
In a sense, the second and third chapters of this dissertation are an attempt to think
politically about film, photography, the environment, and animals in innovative ways.
The majority of scholarship that has been done within the expanding field of eco-cinema
concerns itself with questions of representation. And in many ways, these approaches
merely expand the priorities and mentalities of identity politics to include the natural
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world and animals as under-represented, or negatively represented marginal groups. This
kind of writing has its place, and perhaps it is the best first step in thinking meaningfully
about the relationship between visual culture and the environment. But it is not my
concern here. The kind of ideas and theory that this dissertation puts forward proceed not
in opposition to this kind of writing, but adjacent or in addition to it.
My reasons for diverting away from questions of representation stem partly from
a problem that haunts a significant amount of writing on the cinema. Too often, writing
on cinema treats a film as nothing more than a plot—which is often where identity
politics takes hold. (Is a transgressive woman punished? Do people of color get
homogenized? Etc. etc.) Again, this approach is not without its merits, but I find it
somewhat limited, where the environment and animals are concerned, as my chapters will
hopefully demonstrate. The idea that a film can be reduced to a plot for the eyes is an
injustice not only to the work of film theory, which at its best offers up new kinds of
experience and exchange between spectator and image, but it is also an injustice to the
incomparable joy of experiencing a great film, of getting on its wavelength, and of
breathing its air. Responding only to a plot leaves not nearly enough room to respond to
the sensation of an image. My second reason for wanting to do something other than a
kind of eco-identity politics comes from a line in Slavoj Žižek’s book on Deleuze,
Organs Without Bodies. Near the end of the book, in a section called “Micro-Fascisms”,
Žižek argues that “the struggle for liberation is not reducible to a struggle for the ‘right to
narrate,’ to the struggle of deprived marginal groups to freely articulate their position”
(190). I read these words to mean that liberation entails something more than “positive
representations” of marginal groups. Of course there ought to be more black filmmakers
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in Hollywood, and depictions of black culture have to go beyond or work against racist
stereotypes. But these things alone will not solve our culture’s problems with racist
policing, economics, or imprisonment. Something more programmatic and fundamental
is required for liberation. Much of the work that has been done in the field of EcoCinema, however, has yet to move beyond concerns with representation. Gasland alone
will not end hydraulic fracturing; Blackfish alone will not release SeaWorld’s animals
into the Pacific. And likewise, liberatory film writing cannot be reduced to writing simply
on behalf of the (mis)represented other.
Of course, the struggle for any kind of liberation is always much more complex
and daunting than one would like. But this dissertation attempts to move beyond the
scholarly work on eco-cinema that satisfies itself with questions of representation. The
issues and arguments I take up here tend to be more programmatic. I am interested in
ecological exchanges, encounters, and relationships, not representations. I am under no
illusions that the struggle to stop the wave of mass extinctions, reverse climate change, or
even to shoot more exciting films is reducible to the theses and analysis of this
dissertation. But I do think that this project’s ideas can improve and expand ecological
discourse within the humanities—the importance of which is a point taken up by the
opening pages of my first chapter.
The first chapter of this dissertation attempts to show where some of the moments
and concepts from classic texts in film theory open a space for ecological or ecocritical
concerns to enter into visual culture. I argue, on the one hand, that dating back to its
inception, film theory has maintained at least a marginal interest in film’s relation with
the environment, and on the other hand that this interdisciplinary approach to film theory
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and to Ecocriticism produces new kinds of responses, encounters, and experiences with
images. In other words, classic concepts in film theory already open up or allow for
ecological approaches to cinema that address—not a film’s representation—but how we
conceive cinema itself.
The second chapter considers a few aspects of the branch of Ecocriticism
concerned with Posthumanism. This discussion begins with an extended analysis and
“close viewing” of Rudolph Arnheim and Godfrey Reggio’s documentary film
Koyaanisqatsi. I argue that the film disrupts the category of the human by expanding our
visual experience into the realm of the machine. This expansion has important
connections to and implications for the world we currently inhabit. Koyaanisqatsi
inaugurates crucial discussions about how we perceive the natural world, how our
perception is affected by drones and drone films, and also about how the disappearance
of leisure and a cultural proclivity toward militarization contribute to these perceptions.
Chapter three concerns itself with photography and animals. The photograph of
pigs, taken by Henri Cartier-Bresson, which I mentioned above, invites viewers to
partake in what Deleuze and Guattari call “becoming-animal.” This invitation is actually
rejoined by Cartier-Bresson’s writing on photography. I argue that this exchange between
viewer and photograph is an opportunity to think about a kind of animal politics and
pathos that avoids the anthropocentric pitfalls of rights-based photography that often
relies on shock or exploitation. From here I consider a few examples of how images of
animals often circulate online and on social media in order to confront the humanist or
anthropocentric imagination that drives this circulation.
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The final chapter of this dissertation focuses on the ways in which Thomas
Pynchon’s novel Gravity’s Rainbow configures cinema and ecology in ways that have
been ignored by most scholarly writing on Pynchon. This configuration not only holds
important implications for how humanities scholarship talks about ecology, but it also
reaches a kind of boiling point in Pynchon’s more recent novel, Inherent Vice, and its
recent film adaptation. I argue that Inherent Vice is not only linked to Gravity’s Rainbow
in terms of its treatment of both cinema and the environment, but that Pynchon’s stoner
beach-novel actually helps illuminate further many of the concerns taken up in the first
three chapters of this dissertation. And so I end the dissertation with theory, which is
where I started. I attempt to work out how cinematic adaptation, and scholarly discussion
thereof, might move closer to adaptation’s Darwinian context.
Combined with the quotation from Žižek about liberation not being reducible to
representation, this dissertation is inspired by the words of Susan Sontag, who ends her
book On Photography, “[i]mages are more real than anyone could have supposed. And
just because they are an unlimited resource, one that cannot be exhausted by consumerist
waste, there is all the more reason to apply the conservationist remedy. If there can be a
better way for the real world to include images, it will require an ecology not only of real
things, but of images as well” (180). Her words imply not only that the relationship
between the “real” world and the world of images is structured ecologically, but they also
suggest explicitly identify images as a resource. And while Sontag does not specify or
extrapolate what nutrients or capacities that resource holds, for me, the world of images is
an opportunity to stretch the reaches of what is possible in the world of the viewer.
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CHAPTER 2. THE ECOLOGICAL MARGINS OF CLASSIC FILM THEORY

2.1.

Ecology at the outset

A sense of urgency saturates a recent special issue of ISLE (21.1). The special
issue on Global Warming begins with a pleading question in the interest of confronting
the ever-intensifying ecological problems that haunt our historical moment and its future:
“What would it mean to drop everything and seek a new voice and a new vision of reality
in response to recognition of a global crisis?” (Slovic and Moore1). In the editorial “A
Call to Writers” which precedes the issue’s scholarly and literary content, editors
Kathleen Dean Moore and Scott Slovic justify the need for new voices and visions of
reality with unnervingly calm statements regarding our current historical moment that
articulate exactly how dire the problems our planet faces are. The editors of ISLE in fact
push the sense of environmental urgency far enough to make the argument that looming
ecological devastation necessitates a change in academic work and research across the
board; citing the 2013 study “Scientific Consensus on Maintaining Humanity’s Life
Support Systems in the 21st Century” conducted by “Anthony D. Baronsky and 500
scientists”, they encourage writers to ask themselves what they would say to—and what
work they might do for—their dying planet (5-6).
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In an effort to duly adapt my own research and field of study to the urgency ISLE
20.1 disseminates, I want to answer the challenges and questions Moore and Slovic pose.
In short, I want to force myself to ask the question “why study films as the planet rapidly
deteriorates?” A number of other questions necessarily follow: How to study films in
light of planetary devastation? What do the fields of Ecocriticism and film studies offer
one another? What kinds of scholarly, aesthetic, and political transformations result from
these offerings?
These questions will consistently prompt and direct the thrust of this dissertation.
But prior to any scholarship, I want to point out and take seriously that, contrary to a
popular expression, life imitates art where the cinema is concerned. The cut, integral to so
many of cinema’s effects and beauties, structures both cinematic and biological vision.
The eyelid, ever-so-briefly, constantly shutters our vision. And what is a staring contest,
if not a test of one’s capacity to endure the intensity of a long take of the world? Every
kid can tell you that a proper staring contest must happen face-to-face, with your
opponent’s face in close-up. I hope that from an academic point of view, the silliness of
raising this point in a dissertation measures just how thoroughly norms and conventions
have cordoned off life from the screen. It is time to resuscitate film studies in the most
literal way: film theory will become more lively by incorporating ecology; the study of
relations between life forms will enliven film studies deadened by conventional
approaches.
To begin, I contend that one reason to study films now—at the outset of global
warming’s effects—is because the cinema is in many ways conducive to imaging the
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ideas and causes of ecocritical priorities and politics. The combination of these two fields
of study is not without precedent, as I also contend that ecological, animal, and
posthuman concerns comprise a continuous thread that runs throughout the subtext and
margins of nearly every major region of film theory dating back to its earliest days. This
chapter will be a kind of theoretical excavation that dusts off old and familiar works of
film theory and highlights their connections to these fields without losing sight of the
works’ original significance. This excavation reveals an ecocritical thread in film theory.
So actually, there are two beginnings or outsets here which prompt what has come to be
called ecocinematic film theory: the beginning of climate change’s noticeable effects on
our world—and a new vision and voice for research in the humanities they demand—and
the outset of moving images, how people wrote about them, and how to look at them.
A number of ecocritical scholars have attempted to bridge cinematic and
environmental/ecological research. For the most part, these scholars have worked in one
of two modes. The most common mode comprises analysis of films in which ecocritical
priorities, politics, and ideas are imaged in either “positive” or “negative” terms,
depending upon the outcome of a given film’s plot. As far as fiction films are concerned,
this kind of work tends to highlight disaster films (The Day After Tomorrow, e.g.) socalled “activist films” (such as Erin Brockovitch) and science fiction B-films from the
1950’s and 1960’s (Invasion of the Body Snatchers.)
The second most common kind of writing that treats the cinema from an
ecocritical view often works as a catalogue of the first. The major essays here are Scott
MacDonald’s essay “Toward an Eco-Cinema” and Adrian Ivakhiv’s “Green Film
Criticism and Its Futures.” Ivakhiv’s text is especially helpful because it carefully
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distinguishes between a surprising number of approaches that make up the “ecocritical
film analysis” mode of writing. As Ivakhiv draws these distinctions, he also explains the
stakes and philosophical underpinnings of each approach, illuminating the ways in which
various approaches to Ecocriticism produce differing kinds of analyses. In the case of
MacDonald’s steps “Toward an Eco-Cinema,” MacDonald’s comments on particular
films tend to overshadow his theory-oriented ideas about how cinema might relate to the
environment. Still, MacDonald makes a valuable theoretical argument where he envisions
“the fundamental job of an ecocinema as a retraining of perception, as a way of offering
an alternative to conventional media-spectatorship” that materializes as “something like a
garden—an ‘Edenic’ respite from conventional consumerism—within the machine of
modern life, as modern life is embodied by the apparatus of media” (109). MacDonald’s
wording here is a reference to his book-length work, The Garden in the Machine: A Field
Guide to Independent Films about Place, which investigates the ways in which specific
films interact with specific places—which is not exactly the same question I’m
investigating here which is how film interacts with the natural world. But to my mind,
what’s missing from the work that has been done thus far on the environment and film is
an attempt to expand the work of film theory into the territory of ecology and
Ecocriticism. The relationship between cinematic and photographic images and the
environment is almost altogether un-theorized, with the exception of passing remarks in
essays focused elsewhere.
Put another way, many of the writers who have worked with film and the
environment have tended to do so almost exclusively with Ecocriticism as their starting
point and emphasis (hence the two dominant modes of writing I mention in the previous
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paragraph.) Cinema seems to be merely invited to a party hosted by Ecocritical scholars.
Rather than being a point of departure into new meditations, this kind of work merely
applies a few interpretive strategies onto images. As a result, the rich offerings of film
theory have been left almost entirely out of the conversation about the relationship
between film and the environment. From what I have found, it seems that only a few film
scholars are infusing their work with ecocritical concerns. This project will address this
gap in scholarship in order to highlight the importance of cinematic experience for
Ecocriticism and to articulate new viewing experiences for film studies.
Ecocriticism, Animal Studies, and Posthumanism are three separate but affiliated
modes of inquiry in the humanities. They are not without some inter- and intradisciplinary conflicts. My intention in this project is not necessarily to intervene in such
disputes. Rather, I want to gather together various questions, concepts, and investigations
these fields make possible regardless of their place within disciplinary disputes. In many
ways, film and photography will be my starting point, and so they will prompt my
investigations in Ecocriticism, Animal Studies, and Posthumanism. Because my
exploration of eco-film theory will be an assemblage of parts borrowed from these
disciplines, a term that can accommodate this breadth will be helpful. To call my work
here an eco-film theory might be in some ways misleading or incomplete. For example,
the eco- prefix does not necessarily make a good heading for the work I’ll do with
animals given the ways in which Animal Studies has been a departure from Ecocriticism
in recent years. Additionally, I hear in “eco-“ a fashionable—if not empty—bourgeois
attempt to claim solidarity with serious environmentalism. Referring, however, to this
project as a geo-film theory after the geophilosophy articulated by Deleuze and Guattari
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in What is Philosophy? might be closer to what I have in mind. According to the OED,
the prefix geo- “form[s] words related to the earth.” This simple and unsurprising
definition points toward the central aim of my dissertation: to conceptualize a relation
between film and earth that accommodates environmental/ecological concerns, animals,
and the instability of the category we call “human.” Still, the aims and pursuits of this
project are not strictly Deleuzian and so geo-film theory is not quite right either. Because
I wish to enter into the budding field of Ecocinematic Studies, I will continue to use this
idiom, even as I contest its most common forms and arguments and reject the way in
which “eco-“ has become a commodified prefix for nearly any kind of consumer product.
Although I will return to them in depth at the end of this chapter, what I find helpful from
Deleuze and Guattari’s geophilosophy by way of introduction here is their statement:
“The concept is…not projective but connective; not hierarchical but linking” (91). My
work toward a geo-film theory (Deleuze and Guattari’s idiom prefers “concept” to theory
but I want to position this work within the field of film theory) proceeds according to
these descriptors by connecting the study of film with the areas mentioned above, nonhierarchically, in order to produce new possibilities for studying cinema and photography
in an era where it has become necessary to prioritize ecological concerns.

2.2.

Eisenstein and Germination

After a discussion of the Kuleshov effect in his essay, “The Cinematographic
Principle and the Ideogram” Eisenstein forcefully declares: “The shot is by no means an
element of montage. / The shot is a montage cell” (37). Eisenstein makes this claim in
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order to combat what he calls the “pernicious make-shift analysis” that suggests montage
is simply “[b]ricks, arranged in series to expound an idea” as Eisenstein builds toward his
famous dictum that “montage is conflict” (36-8). But within this famous passage of film
theory, where Eisenstein gives a theoretical account of his own visually jarring editing
style, film scholars overlook the idea that a shot is a cell as opposed to an element—this
difference in fact gives montage its capacity for conflict. Cinema, then, despite its
technology relying upon exposures, chemicals, and emulsions, shares kinship with
biology as opposed to chemistry. Eisenstein elaborates the cellular, biological conflict of
a cell-shot that produces montage; he writes, “[j]ust as cells in their division form a
phenomenon of another order, the organism or embryo, so, on the other side of the
dialectical leap from the shot, there is montage” (37). Counterintuitive to what one might
expect, montage is not the result of a process that resembles a chemical compound, where
discrete elements bond to one another in order to form a molecule that could be called
montage. Instead, the process that produces montage is more like mitosis or meiosis. For
Eisenstein, then the motion picture is the development of a living organism.
For as long as there has been film theory, there have been theorists who regret the
cinema’s infantile state. In a sense, film theory’s numerous schools and approaches are
merely about finding new ways to say that cinema remains in its infancy. Written in
1963, long after the cinematic inventions of sound and color, Stan Brakhage’s Metaphors
on Vision says that “The devout, who break popcorn together in your humblest doublefeature services, know that [the cinema is] still being born” (Brakhage 229). Siegfried
Kracauer accounts for cinema’s existence as though it were “Like the embryo in the
womb”, developing from the photograph and the daguerreotype before it. And although
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he does not agree with the sentiment, Antonin Artaud begins his essay “Sorcery and the
Cinema” (a crucial piece of film theory for my third chapter) with “We hear it endlessly
repeated that the cinema is in its infancy and that we’re only witnessing its first
stammerings” (Artaud 103). But whereas most film theorists who raise this point do so in
order to complain about what films are popular, Eisenstein’s writing says cinema is in its
infancy not because of the fledgling films of popular cinema but because montage itself is
a kind of embryo. The question to address, then, is what kind of organism is the cinema?
Regardless of historical periods or geographical determinations, the cinema grows
into any number of various life forms. Identifying, naming, or classifying these life forms
is not necessarily productive. In Strike, for example, Eisenstein’s montage cells divide
into both slaughtered calves and repressed workers. What could one call this kind of
cinematic life? And how would such a naming enhance a viewer’s experience of the
film? The point, here, is that whatever it is about the cinema that belongs to the realm of
bios or the organic complicates the natural-cultural divide that relegates the cinema to the
term “plastic art.” Instead of upholding such a conventional binary, the cinema and its
theorization spoils (or deconstructs in Derrida’s idiom) the misguided, but still widely
maintained, binary that cordons the natural off from the cultural.

2.3.

Vertov, Derrida, and l’animot

One of the most salient ideas from Jacques Derrida’s book The Animal that
Therefore I Am is that the history of philosophy has treated all animals as effectively the
same and interchangeable. As a response, Derrida posits the philosophical concept of
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“l’animot” as an attempt to address philosophy’s shortcomings, and to open up a path that
allows more nuanced reflection on animals (plural.) What Derrida does not make explicit,
however, is where his concept actually shows itself. Derrida often uses literary criticism
and interpretation in order to clarify and concretize his philosophy (see Specters of Marx
or “Ulysses Gramophone: Hear Say Yes in Joyce”), but the l’animot concept remains
fairly abstract in The Animal that Therefore I Am. Of course the entire lecture is prompted
by Derrida’s reflection on encountering his cat while nude—an anecdote Derrida
recounts in the text. But unlike Derrida’s discussion of Hamlet in Specters of Marx,
which illustrates his configuration of the spectral and the political, Derrida explicates
l’animot almost entirely in relation to a philosophical history that ties Descartes, Lacan,
and Heidegger together vis-à-vis philosophy’s improvident consideration of animals. The
cinema, however, is uniquely suited to image and concretize, Derrida’ concept.
The first aspect of Derrida’s concept of l’animot, laid out early in The Animal
that Therefore I Am (More to Follow) concerns the fact that “[t]here is no Animal in the
general singular” (47). The problem Derrida observes here is that although giraffes are
not interchangeable with dolphins, which are not interchangeable with moose, and so on,
philosophy’s default setting when it attempts to address animals is to homogenize the
entire animal kingdom into a single mass category. Investigating animal being under the
assumption that there is no substantive ontological variation between animals no matter
the species—not to mention variation within a given species—is imprecise and
inauspicious, considering the absurdity of what underpins that mode of investigation.
Employing the term “the Animal” as though a “general singular” animal actually existed,
assumes that domesticated cats experience the world in the same way as hermit crabs
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because whatever can be said about “the Animal” must be true of all animals since the
term attempts to put all disparate animal species onto a single ontological ark. Derrida
rightly calls readers’ attention to the dubious character of the term. For Derrida, then, the
term l’animot replaces “the Animal” by “hav[ing] the plural animals heard in the
singular” (47) due to a homonym in French between the “aux” of “animaux,” as in
animals plural, and “ot” of “mot,” the singular for “word.”
But why overlay the word “animals” with the word “word?” The second and third
components Derrida lays out vis-à-vis “l’animot” confront the commonly held view that
language is the principal thing that fundamentally separates humans from animals. (I’ll
describe them here conjointly because they are more intimately linked to each other than
the general plural idea of the first.) Derrida includes “mot” as his concept’s suffix so as to
attach a reminder that it is a mistake philosophically to erase or downplay the important
differences between human and animal existence. Derrida encourages readers to resist the
temptation to “‘[give] speech back’ to animals” in order to attempt to “think the absence
of the name and of the word otherwise, and as something other than a privation” (48).
The question, then, is how to perceive the absence of speech as something other than a
lack or deprivation of speech.
I think that there are two obvious models for thinking absence in non-negative
terms. The first has to do with color. In rudimentary terms, the eye perceives specific
colors when particular frequencies are reflected, rather than absorbed. So a tennis ball, for
example, absorbs all of the light that produces every color except the light that makes its
particular shade of green. A tennis ball’s bright green color is actually the effect of its
light not being retained by the ball. The second possibility for thinking animals’ absent
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speech as something other than lack has to do with necessity or redundancy. When I hear,
for example, “Come on in My Kitchen” by Robert Johnson, I do not think “wow, this
song lacks a good trombone part…” The simply arranged acoustic guitar-based song is
indeed a musical abundance; all instruments but an acoustic guitar may be absent, but the
song lacks nothing. These two examples—a tennis ball and “Come on in My Kitchen”—
might begin to approach absence as something other than lack.
Cinema and photography are particularly suited to answer Derrida’s challenge to
think philosophically about animals in terms of l’animot. The task entails three central
facets: give due attention to the specificity and heterogeneity of animal species so as to
avoid the trap of a general singular animal, resist anthropomorphism and the facile
overlapping of human and animal being, and finally to think absent speech as something
besides lack. Literature and painting may also be well-suited to l’animot, but if “The
close-up is the soul of cinema” (Epstein 236), as Jean Epstein believes, then films place
audiences into face-to-face encounters that separate cinema from other art forms. (I will
discuss in chapter three the significance of animals in close-up in Georges Franju’s Blood
of the Beasts.)
An animal cannot appear on screen or in a photograph in general. There are no
images of unspecified animals—and in that adjective I hope to carry along the word’s
relation to species. Without opening up a discussion here about medium specificity, the
narrator of a novel for instance, might tell readers that a character was afraid of an
encounter with an animal, or heard an animal sound without specifying the animal in
question, but a film or a photograph cannot maintain ambiguity where animals are
concerned. A photograph can be blurred in order to keep an animal’s species a mystery,
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but that the ambiguity in that case rests on a distorting effect is telling. In order for an
animal to appear unidentifiable in a photograph, a photographer has to in a sense violate
the techniques and practices (measuring light, timing the exposure, e.g.) that produce an
ambiguous animal. In no way is this to say a photographer shouldn’t violate or
experiment with the conventions of photography, I merely want to highlight
photography’s relationship with the concept of l’animot where a clear image of a bull will
always announce the species Bos Taurus.
In terms of Derrida’s third proposition concerning l’animot, Dziga Vertov,
provides an apt cinematic example of where and how l’animot brushes up against the
cinema. Vertov’s brief essay “On the Significance of Nonacted Cinema” is on the whole
a manifesto against the romantic commercial films that populated the screen in his (and
indeed our) day. As Vertov asserts the things that separate his cadre of Soviet filmmakers
from popular cinema, he argues that cinema is not nearly cinematic enough: “every
motion picture is a mere literary skeleton covered with a film skin. At best some film-fat
and film-flesh beneath that skin…We never see the film-skeleton…we have no filmobjects” (36 emphasis mine). What I want to call attention to in this quotation is that for
Vertov, popular films’ abundance of literary qualities (romance, narrative) is in fact a
cinematic restriction. And Vertov pushes this argument much further near the conclusion
of the essay. Vertov contends that “by establishing a clear visual link between subjects,
we have significantly weakened the importance of intertitles; in so doing we have
brought the movie screen closer to the uneducated viewers, which is particularly
important at present” (38). Here all of my interests come to the forefront, hand in hand.
The elimination of speech—manifest in silent films via the intertitle—is for Vertov a
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serious accomplishment. For Vertov, the absence of (cinematic) speech is not a privation
but a bounty as it frees up his films to become film-objects. In other words, producing
film-objects depends largely on absenting speech. This is a context that not only makes it
possible to “think the absence of…the word otherwise, and as something other than a
privation,” Vertov’s cinema actively encourages it.
I’m left, however, with the question of where and how animals relate to Vertov’s
moment of film theory and history. The short answer here is that since language is
philosophy’s favorite divisor between humans and animals, then absenting language from
the cinema brushes audiences up against something animal in their experience of a filmobject, “a finished étude of absolute vision, rendered exact and deepened by all existing
optical instruments, principally by the movie camera experimenting in space and time”
(Vertov 37).
[etude=study; specify what animal experience vision puts us in contact with, apparatus is
a bridge to experience—not a mediation/distortion of truth]

2.4.

Bazin, Cartier-Bresson

In one of the most famous essays in visual culture, André Bazin’s “The Ontology
of the Photographic Image,” Bazin articulates photography’s inherent relation to
preservation through the process of embalming. As Bazin begins to distinguish
photography from painting, he argues that “[a]ll the arts are based on the presence of
man, only photography derives an advantage from his absence. Photography affects us
like a phenomenon in nature, like a flower or a snowflake whose vegetable or earthly
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origins are an inseparable part of their beauty.” (13) The easy, and superficial reading of
Bazin’s lines would emphasize—and go no further than—Bazin’s recourse to the natural
world to discuss photography’s “nature.” Sure, it’s nice and quaint to think that a good
photograph is like a flower: neither photograph nor the flower require the viewer’s
knowledge of the chemical reactions involved in their creation, they ask only to be
appreciated talis quails.
I want to explore something else, however. I am actually more interested in the
first idea in the quotation. What is the advantage photography derives from human
absence? Even more basically, what does it mean for humans to be absent from
photography? Unlike, say, flowers and snowflakes, photographs do not occur without
photographers. The photographic absence of humans needs some clarification. If
meteorology explains to humans how snowflakes occur, and ecology explains to humans
how flowers blossom, then what explains to humans how they are absent from something
that depends on them for existence?
My answer here has something to do with the way Vertov’s elimination of
subtitles in The Man with a Movie Camera overlaps human cinematic experience with the
absence of language that partly defines animals’ being. I would argue that photography,
the activity of taking photographs and of viewing them, is a becoming-animal in
Deleuzian terms, where what humans understand to be the non-languaged experience of
animals passes through the languaged human, that helps explain Bazin’s statement that
photography “derives an advantage from [human] absence.” More recently, Akira Mizuta
Lippit has similarly stated that “the photograph provides a moment with radical absence”
(Lippit 172). The substance of this radicalism, what makes the encounter radical, is the
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way photographic images decenter and destabilize the human being and its default
settings for encountering the world. Images have the capacity to jettison the trappings of
anthropocentrism in favor of tapping into whatever remains of animal being within the
human species.
It is important here to distinguish photography (and cinema by extension) from
painting. Bazin underscores the absence of the human by highlighting the mechanical
process of producing a photograph: “For the first time an image of the world is formed
automatically, without the creative intervention of man” (13). With painting, however,
the style and personality of the artist is implicitly bound up with the process of creating
an image. (It’s not just an arresting use of light, it’s Vermeer’s light; It’s not just a wild
brushstroke, it’s Van Gogh’s wild brushstroke.) For Bazin, “The personality of the
photographer enters into the proceedings only in his selection of the object to be
photographed” (13 emphasis mine). In his essay “Painting and Cinema”, Bazin makes an
interesting point about the frame:
Indeed it is a mistake to see a picture frame as having a merely decorative or
rhetorical function. The fact that it emphasizes the compositional quality of the
painting is of secondary importance. The essential role of the frame is, if not to
create at least to emphasize the difference between the microcosm of the picture
and the macrocosm of the natural world in which the painting has come to take its
place. This explains the baroque complexity of the traditional frame whose job it
is to establish something that cannot be geometrically established—namely the
discontinuity between the painting and the wall, that is to say between the paining
and reality. (165)
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Painting, then, does not promote an encounter with absence. For Bazin, painting is about
bringing the world of the viewer (which Bazin calls reality) in touch with a different
world that lies within the painting inside the frame. Photography, on the other hand, is
about encountering absence; photography asks the viewer to encounter a point of time
and space that belongs to the world of the viewers but for which they are absent.
As he writes about the work of photographing, Henri Cartier-Bresson describes
“becom[ing] serious” about photography, Cartier-Bresson says: “I was on the scent of
something, and I was busy smelling it out” (20). This is an odd way to talk about
photography. Smells and images seem to be incompatible with each other. How could
Cartier-Bresson photograph a smell? Likewise, what does a photograph offer your nose?
In his book Electric Animal, Akira Mizuta Lippit observes that “[t]hinking about smell
possesses a long history in Western philosophy, converging at times with the discourse
on animality” (122).
What is fascinating in Cartier-Bresson’s writing is that—philosophically—he
does not so much theorize a way to “smell” a photograph as much as he argues that smell,
a regressive sense according to humanist philosophy, opens up the space for creativity;
for Cartier-Bresson, adopting an animal-like engagement with the world allows
photography to happen. Lippit provides a concise history of scent’s place in philosophical
discourse on animals that touches on Plato, Freud, Horkheimer and Adorno, and Vicki
Hearne. With the exception of Hearne, philosophy tends to disparage smell. For Plato,
smell is at odds with thought, For Freud, smell and its complex relation to memory is a
vehicle of repression. Adorno and Horkheimer relate smell to shame. Directly following
this discussion of smell’s history in philosophy, Lippit shifts his attention to Deleuze and
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Guattari’s concept of becoming-animal. It is as though Lippit suggests the concept of
becoming-animal as a rebuttal to philosophy’s typical dismissal of bestial smell.
The cinema itself is in fact “bestial” in the sense that it is so disgustingly
entwined with capitalist mentalities that it comes to resemble something Derrida points
out about livestock (and other animals as well.) Derrida writes, in one of the flashes of
crystal clarity that make The Animal that Therefore I Am particularly compelling, “to cut
straight to the chase, what the nonrational animal is deprived of, along with subjecthood,
is what Kant calls ‘dignity’…that is to say, an internal and priceless value, the value of an
end in itself, or if you prefer, a price above any comparable or negotiable price, above
any market price. There can be a negotiable market price for the animal” (100). The
filiation here between the cinema and animals here by virtue of their subordination to the
market is clear. Disavowal structures the filiation: with respect to animals, we know very
well that these “commodities” are lives, lives that not only suffer, but that also occupy a
particular and essential place in a given ecosystem, but they pose opportunities for human
profit nonetheless. Likewise, we know very well that the cinema comprises art and that as
Heidegger points out valuing art devalues it, but this is a medium with enormous global
appeal, and therefore poses an immense opportunity for profit. Of course, I do not want to
equate the abhorrent conditions animals that exist for profit endure with the crassness of
the studio system, but I want to highlight what Derrida might call a filiation between the
two where subjugation to capital is concerned.
The important question here is how this filiation plays out. And what paths of
escape exist. Robert Bresson’s heartbreaking and understated Au Hasard, Balthasar
provides a good case study for the relationship between capital, animals, and images.
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Although viewers see the titular donkey Balthasar subjected to several different owners
during the film’s drama, Bresson refuses to put the transactions that shuffle Balthasar
from owner to owner on screen. It is precisely this directorial decision that imbues
Balthasar with a certain dignity in the film. It is as though seeing Balthasar being sold
would undermine his dignified position as a kind of Greek chorus in the film, observing
without commenting. As Coetzee’s protagonist Elizabeth Costello declares, “Animals
have only their silence left with which to confront us” (25). And as Akira Lippit points
out, in his reading of Giorgio Agamben, “What flows from the animal touches language
without entering into it, dissolving memory, like the unconscious, into a timeless present”
(166). I take the phrase timeless present” here, where Balthasar is concerned, to mean
that not only do animals live (as far as we can tell) almost exclusively in the present (at
least that which we humans call the present), without becoming preoccupied with what
tomorrow might bring, and although animals certainly possess something like memory,
they are not burdened by the past. This animal temporality that Lippit describes becomes
important in Bresson’s film, as viewers must “catch up” with Balthasar as we realize he
has come to be owned by someone new. Viewers must adjust their expectations and in a
sense, begin watching the film anew, learning what they can about Balthasar’s new lives.
Lippit’s lush description here of how animals collide with language without taking part in
it serves as an equally compelling analysis of Au Hasard, Balthasar. Seeing Balthasar
with new owners without having seen the donkey be exchanged indeed “dissolves
memory” producing a “timeless present” because it is often unclear in the film for how
long Balthasar has lived in new circumstances by the time viewers recognize that an
exchange has taken place. Bresson establishes this effect early on in the film as a cut
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jarringly moves from Balthasar as a young donkey, to a shot of Balthasar’s new owner
whipping a now adult Balthasar.

Figure 2.1
!
!
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Figure 2.2

Figure 2.3
The cut is jarring for a few reasons. Balthasar’s youth is a point of emphasis nearly each
time he appear on screen before this cut. His wonderfully fluffy and soft-looking coat, the
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rapport with the children, and the visual comparisons of their small bodies each work to
impress upon viewers that Balthasar is just a baby. The cut to a new owner
simultaneously signals a new time for viewers, and we must adjust quickly to Balthasar’s
present. As Balthasar comes under the watch of new owners, the film calls up hazy
memories of previous owners where time is very difficult to pin down or determine.
Lippit’s comments also extend to the nature of the cinema itself. Without here completely
opening up a discussion devoted to the specificity of the cinematic medium, I’ll say that
images always happen in the present tense. Barthes comments on this phenomenon
extensively, where photography is concerned, in Camera Lucida, and in films, even films
that take place in the past, or that include sequences of flashback—indicating that they
are past—the viewer experiences them in the present. There are two important
connections with Derrida’s work here to note. First, that absence (of images of
transaction) is productive, something other than privation. Secondly, the film is an
exercise in the antagonism between “market price for the animal” and dignity. Whatever
price the film’s characters negotiate for Balthasar’s exchange, Bresson refuses to image
it. What viewers are left with is a cinematic encounter with an animal that indeed has
value “above any market price.” This idea lends a political significance to the relationship
between animals and cinema. And although animals will become the focus of my third
chapter, Francesco Casetti’s argument that “on the screen…we see what we have
become” (85) will continue to think through the political dimension of this conversation.
What I argue for is something slightly more complex than a mirror’s reflection. My
primary focus for chapter two picks up on this conversation as it plays out in Godfrey
Reggio’s ecologically-tinged 1983 documentary Koyaanisqatsi.
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CHAPTER 3. KOYAANISQATSI AND POSTHUMAN ECOLOGY

3.1.

Introduction

Why do we enjoy and share drone footage? One of my undergraduate students
recently told me that he regularly enjoys watching the images someone took while flying
their drone through Chernobyl. Friends in my Facebook feed like, share, and re-post
drone footage taken at abandoned amusement parks; one popular drone clip on YouTube
featuring dolphins swimming and breaking at Dana Point, CA has garnered over ten and
a half million views. But why? How do drone and GoPro technologies combine to
produce a particular kind of cinematic enjoyment that differs from what is found in both
Hollywood action movies and a certain genre of time-lapse documentary films that
includes Godfrey Reggio’s Koyaanisqatsi and Rob Fricke’s Baraka? How could these
films’ popularity be anything other than a frightening example of the ways in which
civilian consciousness, desire, and entertainment is fast becoming increasingly
militarized?
When amazon.com inevitably begins using drones to deliver packages to my
door, am I naïve enough to believe that I am—from the drone’s point of view—
fundamentally different from the Syrian, Pakistani, or Yemeni civilians and military
targets who regularly receive deadly drone deliveries from the US military? On what
grounds am I different? Of course it should certain be pointed out that plenty of
transportation technologies (planes, helicopters, e.g.) maintain a military usage and
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importance that does not impinge upon civilian life and that the fact of their appropriation
by the military-industrial complex does not necessarily sound the alarm about their place
in civilian life. (Should I ever require Life Flight, for example, I would gladly accept it.)
The difference with drones and their emergence onto the cultural landscape is that they
are affordable. Unlike an airplane, one does not need excessive amounts of wealth to own
one. Still something of a novelty, a drone can be purchased for personal use for less than
the cost of an iPhone. And that they are part of an ongoing process of militarizing civilian
life is underscored by the camouflage paint job adorning one popular model, the Parrot
AR Drone 2.0.

Figure 3.1
The idea that drones contribute to the breakdown in military and civilian spheres extends
well beyond one drone’s paint job. Questions relating to time-sensitivity, “precision”, and
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decreases in paid personnel motivate both the military’s increasing reliance upon drones
and my future amazon delivery. In multiple contexts, drones already haunt our future. I
use “haunt” here to describe the not-yet-material reality that lurks in our future, and at the
same time as to register the hundreds of civilian casualties whose lives have ended as
collateral damage in drone strikes on “appropriate” military targets.
At the outset of his book War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, Manuel De
Landa argues that “even if Artificial Intelligence is not at present sufficiently
sophisticated to create true ‘killer robots,’ when synthetic intelligence does make its
appearance on the planet, there will already be a predatory role awaiting it” (1). Likewise,
drones’ military origins insure that as (adequately wealthy) westerners become
increasingly enamored and owners of drone technology, and the smooth flight-like
images they produce, the distinction between military and civilian or recreational usage is
already lost. How long before drone ownership and second amendment fanaticism collide
in increasingly tragic outcomes?

3.2.

Nonhuman Vision

I show my undergraduate students the 1983 documentary film Koyaanisqatsi; they
are bored. And yet, how different are the images of Koyaanisqatsi from drone and GoPro
images? (Especially considering the slow, birds-eye-view sequences of desert expanse.)
Doesn’t Reggio’s camera offer the same attractions? Flight simulation, recognizable
locations, views impossible to get from on the ground or with the naked eye alone?
Perhaps the crucial difference is that Koyaanisqatsi points toward an important
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distinction between mechanical and militarized vision. And because we already inhabit
the mechanical vision Koyaanisqatsi predicts, we are well-prepared to receive the
militarized camerawork of drones.
The various bonds, divisions, and transformations between humans and machines
are not new subjects for the philosophy of Posthumanism or for film theory. Many film
scholars point to Dziga Vertov as film theory’s formative voice advocating for cinema to
assert itself as an art form by becoming more mechanical. In his book The Language of
New Media, Lev Manovich takes Vertov and his film Man with a Movie Camera “as [his]
guide to the language of new media” (xv) and indeed the book serves as a kind of
exploration in the logical extensions of the idea that movies are mechanical and what it
means for images to detach from celluloid in the internet age. Vertov himself concludes
“WE: Variant of a Manifesto” by exclaiming “Hurrah for the poetry of machines,
propelled and driving; the poetry of levers, wheels, and wings of steel” (9). But the
question of human-machine relationships is duly important for the inclusion of ecology
within the broad range of humanities scholarship (Ecocriticism.) Ron Burnett in fact
use[s] the term ecology in reference to the indivisible nature of human-machine
relations and the interdependence of humans on the technologies the create.
Ecology does not necessarily mean harmony or an ideal balance of forces and
energies that sustain the connections between humans and machines. Rather,
ecology is a term that suggests the many interrelationships that people develop
between each other to engage with the communities of which they are a part. (72)
Indeed for reasons I will elaborate below, Koyaanisqatsi is an important ecological film
precisely because of the imbalances it recognizes and confronts viewers with. Although
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his focus is not exactly ecological, Graham Cairns notes that Reggio’s film “us[es] the
natural characteristics of the landscape to play with viewer perception” (78). This “play
with viewer perception” is precisely what I find most striking about Reggio’s film—
Koyaanisqatsi puts each of these concerns—the human, the machine, the ecological, and
the cinematic—into a single disruptive documentary constellation.
The subjects of Reggio’s film are generally banal. Some of the film’s most
memorable images are of desert, clouds, pedestrians, and cars. But the film’s effect is
anything but banal. The intensity of the images—particularly toward the film’s end—is
profound. Koyaanisqatsi‘s bracing rhythms, repetitions, and juxtapositions actually
transform the experience of ordinary, commonplace objects into something disorienting
and extraordinary. Part of the reason these ordinary subjects become extraordinary is due
to art’s capacity for defamiliarization. Russian formalist Victor Shklovsky explains that
“art removes objects from the automatism of perception” and “makes the familiar seem
strange” (779). Koyaanisqatsi’s images of ordinary things and scenes acquire an
additional measure of strangeness, however, because the camera images them through
nonhuman eyes.
Unlike the demonstrative camera of, say, Alfred Hitchcock, which seems at times
to insist “ Hey! Make sure you see and remember this!”, as in Psycho when the camera
moves in on Marion’s motel room nightstand, where she has folded a newspaper over
stolen money, Godfrey Reggio’s camera is unnervingly impassive. It stares at city traffic
for twenty-four hours without blinking. And when it moves, it moves not to point
something out to readers but to intensify its state. In one memorable instance, the camera
fixes upon a wooden-faced pilot, whose unfeeling expression perfectly matches the
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camera’s own. But as the camera approaches the pilot, it is not at all like the camera’s
approach to Marion’s nightstand. Reggio’s camera seems to want to get closer in the
same way a poker player with a winning hand wants to raise a bet; if it’s a staring contest
this pilot wants, it’s a staring contest he will certainly get from Reggio’s camera. And the
camera will win—it actually seems to look through the pilot as much as it looks at him.

Figure 3.2
And so in this moment of intense staring, Koyaanisqatsi sets mechanical and human
vision against one another, quite literally face-to-lens. This moment, roughly halfway
through Reggio’s film, where two visual registers consider one another, becomes a point
of entry for considering cinematic experience. Although it reaches a kind of pinnacle
while tracking in on the pilot, the camera’s mechanical, impartial demeanor is clearly
established in the film’s first twenty or so minutes, where the camera is content to linger
in vast desert spaces, hover over seemingly endless oceans, and drift in between clouds.
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Rudolph Arnheim’s famous book, Film as Art, distinguishes clearly between the
content and the form of an image. Discussing a hypothetical image of a boat seen from
high above, Arnheim says “the result is a view very seldom seen in real life. The interest
is thereby diverted from the subject [the boat] to the form [the boat’s presentation]…The
spectator is thus brought to see something familiar as something new. At this moment
[the spectator] becomes capable of true observation…the objects themselves become
more vivid and therefore more capable of effect” (43-4). The camera’s methodical
surveying of the desert achieves this effect. The camera peers a little too slowly around
rock formations, and it lingers on a scene in which nothing happens for what seems to be
a little too long. I say too slowly and too long because the pacing of Reggio’s camera is a
distinct and uncomfortable break with the way we look at the natural world off-screen.
Reggio’s trip through the American southwest is not a vacation to see the Grand
Canyon. Instead, Reggio radically challenges viewers’ attention spans, which are
conditioned and ever-shortened by any number of aspects of a “life out of balance.” The
film’s opening sequences are a dare: Reggio’s deliberate camera mockingly dares us
human viewers to be bored by the beauty of the southwest, and by Reggio’s generously
lengthy presentation of it. And so what happens is that viewers recalibrate, we have no
choice but to align our visual sensibilities with the camera’s. Of course the argument
could be made that all films require such a recalibration. Un Chien Andalou is tolerable
only if one sees it with dada eyes. Brakhage’s rough and painted films require some other
visual adaptation. But Koyaanisqatsi is a little different because it makes boredom
revelatory. Passing through boredom, feeling it and then troubleshooting it marks a
movement into what I will call nonhuman vision. As we come to accept the slow and
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impassive camera, we begin to see the desert unnaturally—in such a way that we would
not see it with our eyes alone. Rudolph Arnheim’s explicit suggestion for understanding
or engaging with a film is for a viewer to “abandon himself to a mental attitude which is
to some extent unnatural” (43). As a point of clarification, writers such as Donna
Haraway and Bruno Latour have persuasively dismantled the barriers that set our
understandings of “nature” apart from “culture”, and I do not intend to imply that there is
some abstract or ableist “natural” vision.
I use “unnatural” here in order to carry Arnheim’s idiom into this Posthuman
discussion, to register Reggio’s cold and mechanical camera, and to demonstrate that
Koyaanisqatsi, its editing, and its camerawork disrupt the naked eye’s “natural” view of
the world. The sense of this kind of language, if dubious now, is actually in keeping with
the spirit of Arnheim’s original argument that when we watch a film, we want to see
something we would not see in our everyday life—something unreal (in a sense,
unnatural.) Arnheim locates the power of this idea in two iconic film defamiliarizations.
Arnheim’s first example is of a train rushing toward the camera, a reference to the
Lumières’ famous “L’arrivée d’un train en la gare de La Ciotat”: “The nearer the engine
comes the larger it appears, the dark mass on the screen spreads in every direction at a
tremendous pace” (61) until it appears far larger than its actual, “real”, off-screen size.
Arnheim’s second example of how reduced depth creates “unnatural” cinematic views in
order to create an effect is of the monks in Carl Th. Dreyer’s The Passion of Joan of Arc,
leaping toward the camera to make them seem all-the-more imposing for both the viewer
and Joan. The temperament of Arnheim’s ideas, which are rooted in the idea that the
cinema admirably distorts what it images, rescues the “unnatural” mental attitude and
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vision I’m describing from accusations of ableism or of ignoring the breaking down of
the nature-culture divide.
As Koyaanisqatsi leaves behind the vast expanses of desert and sky and begins to
study urban spaces, the film’s images continue to achieve the effect Arnheim describes
but in new ways—perhaps most obviously through time-lapse, which pervades the scenes
that come after the opening desert scenes. Through time-lapse, clouds and oceans come
to resemble one another by virtue of the shape and rhythms of their movement. These
shapes and rhythms are, of course, inaccessible to the human eye alone, off-screen. We
see clouds and oceans move, but never in the ways that they do in Koyaanisqatsi. The
images are manipulated and wholly “unnatural” in the sense that seeing what
Koyaanisqatsi offers requires a camera and some trickery (editing.) What I want to
highlight here is that Arnheim describes the results of “unnatural” or more-than-real
images as “true observation.” Counter-intuitively—especially within a documentary
context—images acquire a certain truth for Arnheim when they do not exactly resemble
reality. Koyaanisqatsi offers a concrete example of this paradox as the film calls such
marked attention to its unnatural presentation of familiar subjects. This, I think,
approaches something crucial for the scholarship that has come to be called
Posthumanism: because these images are inaccessible to the naked human eye, the
machine that makes them accessible (cinema) disrupts the default settings of human
experience, and this disruption is revelatory.
The question, then, is what Koyaanisqatsi reveals along these lines. Ironically, it’s
during the film’s middle and latter sections, where the City and its human inhabitants
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come to the fore, that the film most clearly disrupts the default settings of human
experience in order to reveal a few of its sad truths.
Although the film merits no more than a footnote in his book, Green Screen:
Environmentalism and Hollywood Cinema, David Ingram sums up perhaps the most
expected or conventional Ecocritical response to Koyaanisqatsi: “[Reggio]…combines in
a non-narrative mode the cult of pristine, ‘empty’ natural landscapes, and their
representation as a spectacle of different speeds, as well as the cult of the ecological
Indian living, unlike urban dwellers, in ‘balance’ with nature” (189). The context in
which this note arises has to do with tracking shots that render “nature as movement”
(30) and this idea begins to approach another popular ecological interpretation of
Reggio’s film. Scott MacDonald, for example, sees Koyaanisqatsi as part of the “city
symphony” film tradition dating back at least to Berlin: Symphony of a Big City (1927).
As a city symphony film, MacDonald argues, Koyaanisqatsi “[depicts] urban spaces as
parts of a broader survey of human experience…the representative day in the life of a city
[is] merely a cell within larger cinematic organisms” (209). These two popular responses
to Koyaanisqatsi are both valuable in their own right, but “cinema can do even more: it
can in fact, embody the logic of the ‘mechanism’ in which we are caught up” (Casetti
85). And it is in this context that I want to explore what Koyaanisqatsi achieves
ecologically; Reggio’s film cinematically configures important questions about the
environment from the literal point of view of a machine.
As Koyaanisqatsi transitions from being fixated on landscape to entering into
urban spaces, the intrusion of machinery, construction, and traffic initially comes as a
shock. The arresting images of human activity might initially suggest that the film
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maintains a natural-cultural divide by emphasizing the tranquility and stillness of the
desert in stark contrast to the hustle and bustle of the city. I would argue, however, that
Koyaanisqatsi is more complicated than that, given the ideas within Arnheim’s film
theory that emphasize the fairly rudimentary idea that an image’s form is no less
important than its content. And while Koyaanisqatsi’s content shifts dramatically, its
form does not. The unnatural vision produced by time-lapse remains consistent regardless
of what fixes the camera’s attention. In the film’s second half, foot and car traffic are
presented to viewers no differently than the movement of ocean or clouds.
Koyaanisqatsi’s form is not interested in a rift between the natural and the cultural. The
utter stillness of the camera as it stares at people on a Las Vegas sidewalk, and at
nighttime traffic is perhaps as unnerving and captivating as the desert scenes are
meditative and boring. In a particularly striking sequence, the camera accommodates both
the activity within the office building and the peregrination of the moon, without giving
preference to either.
Before this arrangement begins to sound too harmonious, it’s important to recall
the meaning of the film’s title. As the film’s final images explain, Koyaanisqatsi is the
Hopi word that translates to “crazy life; life out of balance; life in turmoil; life
disintegrating; a state of life that calls for another way of living.” Film scholars have
often attributed an ecological message to the film’s title, reinforced by the film’s images
of human tampering with the environment that borders on hubris. The film’s title,
however, acquires new significance if one considers the film’s disruption of default
human vision: in complete accordance with the ecological register, life out of balance
also comes too mean life too human, an imbalance that Koyaanisqatsi works to correct
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through its form. In nearly every frame where humans appear, they move only in the
most regimented, habitual, and even controlled ways. Koyaanisqatsi’s form makes
ordinary patterns of human behavior look mechanical by imaging them through
nonhuman vision. As Arnheim instructs, an unnatural presentation of familiar objects
permits “true observation” of the objects themselves. If we were actually walking around
times square, driving Los Angeles’ freeways, or turning out the lights of our office, we
probably would not observe the rigid and mechanical patterns of behavior that we
experience on-screen, through Koyaanisqatsi’s nonhuman eyes. This experience,
informed by Arnheim, anachronistically answers Cary Wolfe’s challenge to rethink and
recontextualize the visual modalities that belong to the domain of the human. Wolfe’s
sense of the posthuman entails a disruption of the ways in which ordinary sensory
experience yields an understanding of the world marked by habituation (habituation
being a point I’ll return to later in this chapter.) Discussing the bizarre and somewhat
alarming work of biocybernetic artist Eduardo Kac, Wolfe admires the way GFP Bunny
“appeals to specifically human visual habits and conventions for the purposes of making
the point that the visual as we traditionally think of it can precisely no longer be indexed
to those conventions and habits at all” (164). In the same spirit, Koyaanisqatsi slows
down the visual perception process in its first thirty minutes, calling viewers’ attention to
their own visual habits and announcing that visual perception will be indexed differently,
beyond their habits, for the duration of the film; experiencing Koyaanisqatsi’s first thirty
minutes as anything other than boring requires viewers to abandon their “taken-forgranted mode of human experience” (Wolfe xxv). The constantly dwindling time
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between cuts in an average Hollywood film, by contrast, encourages the Humanist
impulse to be initially bored by Koyaanisqatsi.
Working with some of Sergei Eisenstein’s famous film theory in my first chapter,
I highlighted the idea that the cinematic shot is a kind of biological cell and that montage
is the organism that grows out of that cellular division. I have resisted here the urge to
specify—and I hope the word species or speciation echoes in this word—the kind of
vision human spectators experience when they see Koyaanisqatsi. At any given moment
in the film, the camera eye might behave like a bird, scanning the ground and the water’s
surface for a meal, or a dog out for a walk in the city, its eye-level just above the average
human knee. But the camera can also be impassive, impartial, and mechanical. The film
can simultaneously feel like the alien vision of a machine. This discrepancy between
living and non-living, natural and cultural, and animal and inanimate grows into a
cinematic experience in Koyaanisqatsi that taps into a fundamental principle of
Posthumanism, that the terms of these binaries are not neatly boxed off from one another,
and that as Cary Wolfe’s work argues, the deconstruction of these binaries offers us
humans a chance to expand the range of our sensory experience. This expansion is
desperately needed according to the film’s logic, as its camera displays humans activity
so bleakly. The nonhuman form “forces us to rethink our taken-for-granted modes of
human experience” (Wolfe xxv) in order to correct the imbalance, insanity, and turmoil
of human life that seems so controlled and simultaneously so destructive.
This is why we need a posthuman and ecological film theory. As our taken-forgranted human activity propels our world down the path of so-called “advances” in
biotechnologies and energy production—and of course it must be said that capital is the
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fuel for this journey—we need posthuman and ecological critiques that register with all
the impact and affect of a great film. If film theory is about articulating what cinema does
and of what it is capable, and if film theory fosters new, “unnatural” visual experiences,
then a general theory of what cinema is capable of vis-à-vis is exactly what is needed to
expand the possibilities for “expand[ing] environmental perception, understanding, and
consciousness” (Ivakhiv 2).

3.3.

A Belabored World

Once, cinema celebrated the vivacious outpouring of “Workers Leaving the
Factory.” The Lumière brothers famous film, according to Sean Cubitt’s rhapsodic
description, set cinema (whether documentary or fictional) onto a course of leisure,
imbuing the cinema with a radically non-productive origin:
[It] is significant that, unlike Marey’s chronophotography, the Lumière
cinematograph was not turned immediately to anthropometric time and motion
studies, aimed at optimal mechanization of gesture in the factory, but to leisure, to
the immediately accessible utopia of time off…[To] have placed at the instigation
of cinema’s dialectic of difference and repetition not a story but an event that is at
once an end—of work—and a beginning—of leisure—neither of which is visible
and neither of which is composable as an equilibrium. In place of closure, we
have only commotion, a document not of truth but of the space between truths.
(Cubitt 20-2)
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Cinema begins, in other words, when work stops. And for Cubitt, the documentary
quality of the Lumières’ film lies between the opposed activities of work and leisure,
showing neither, but simultaneously conveying both. Koyaanisqatsi tragically repeats and
updates the effects Cubitt sees and celebrates in the Lumieres’ famous film. But whereas
Cubitt sees in “Workers Leaving the Factory” a utopic potential for cinema’s future, I see
in Koyaanisqatsi an unhappy warning.
Unlike the Lumières, Reggio documents not workers leaving the workplace, but
shift changes. Koyaanisqatsi evacuates all sense of leisure and down-time, in exchange
for constant business and occupation. Workers in Koyaanisqatsi do not seem to have time
off, but to simply toggle from on or off (-duty) positions. But unlike the idiosyncratic and
chaotic movements of the workers in the Lumières’ film, Reggio’s subjects move in a
kind of controlled hysteria. The speed of the image showing people fleeing into and out
of the Lockheed building suggests exactly zero leisure. The hurry to begin work appears
to be mirrored by the panic to leave it. And so in addition to the ecological, and
posthuman significances of the film’s title, Koyaanisqatsi puts on screen a life temporally
out of balance where the work-leisure rhythms of modern life have ceased to alternate.
Workers never leave the factory in the world of Koyaanisqatsi; there are only shift
changes.
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Figure 3.3

Figure 3.4
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Night does not have any bearing upon the stoppage of work. One famous
sequence of the film displays the continuous flow of lights and traffic for a twenty-four
hour period, and Koyaanisqatsi features many scenes of the city at night. One montage in
particular moves from a busy and illuminated city-scape to a single man working the
night-shift in an anonymous control room of some kind. On-the-clock, but thoroughly
unengaged in any kind of labor, the man sits on-duty with not apparent duties to carry
out. He slumps backward in a chair idly smoking a cigarette—an object that often
suggests leisure in films, but here subsumed by work. The man’s haggard face seems to
contemplate his own isolation from the world as he awaits either actual work to do, or the
end of his shift. The message here is not that work in the modern world allows for leisure,
the point is that one cannot differentiate between the two; day and night present no
meaningful distinction for the hustle and bustle within an office building, the flow of
automobile traffic, etc. The world of Koyaanisqatsi simply has no use for leisure.
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Figure 3.5

Figure 3.6
Elsewhere, even when its images do not explicitly recall “Workers Leaving the
Factory,” Koyaanisqatsi evacuates leisure from the cinematic experience. The scenes at
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the beginning of the film show us deserts and rivers bereft of campers and swimmers. We
see thousands of cars and pedestrians, but no one seems to be travelling, everyone is busy
getting to where they need to be. Even when Reggio’s camera fixes a crowded beach in
Southern California, the ominous presence of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
lurking all-too-close to surfers and sunbathers forbids viewers from sharing in the
relaxation enjoyed by the people on-screen. The image becomes a kind of dramatic irony,
or a transformation of the “Look out! He’s right behind you!” shot from a horror film.
We see people playing arcade games and dancing, but the time-lapse only suggests a
joyless, mechanical engagement with the things we call entertainment, but which should
allow access to leisure.
What are these sequences concerning labor, which half-mockingly reprises the
Lumière brothers’ “Workers Leaving the Factory” doing in a film about the modern
Western world’s relationship to the planet? It is no coincidence that one of the film’s
sequences showing a midday shift-change occurs at a Lockheed facility. The
manufacturer of many military aircraft, Lockheed’s very existence signifies the
commercial and economic breakdown between military and civilian sectors.
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Figure 3.7
Just seven years before Koyaanisqatsi’s release, Lockheed was at the center of a massive
bribery scandal that entailed paying massive sums of money to various governments to
guarantee contracts for producing military aircraft. A Los Angeles Times article marking
the death of Lockheed’s former president, A. Carl Kotchian, calls Kotchian “a key figure
in what became one of the biggest bribery scandals ever” (Pae “Ex-Lockheed Chief…”).
The collapse of military and civilian spheres certainly does not begin with
Lockheed. But Koyaanisqatsi registers this collapse in several ways. Certainly the film
encourages viewers to consider what in means for Lockheed’s presence to be included in
the film (in much the same way the film ironically includes a Kentucky Fried Chicken ad
encouraging patrons to “Have a Barrel of Fun.”) Part of Lockheed’s significance within
the film is to put the questions of labor and cultural militarization into the context of how
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we interact with and relate to the environment. And this combination does not bode well
for the future of the environment.
Paul Virilio’s book Popular Defense & Ecological Struggles takes up this very
question of ecology within the context of a militarized society. Beginning with historical
examples of the erosion of distinct military and civilian spheres, citing specifically the
creation of “the army as social class” (12), Virilio argues that “from the beginning,
military intelligence has struggled against…the chaos of the natural environment and the
spontaneous movements that can occur within it” (14). Not only does Virilio’s analysis
align ecology with spontaneity, one could also read in it an implicit alignment of
militarization with habituation, and this casts a particularly concerning light upon the
habits associated with vision Cary Wolfe challenges Posthumanism to confront. The
humanist vision Wolfe wants to disrupt is simultaneously a militarized vision is Virilio’s
idiom. The implications here for understanding and responding to the complexity of
Koyaanisqatsi are that we must see the utterly mechanical behavior of human activity in
the film as a graph or index of the population’s militarization. Of course this
understanding is underscored by particular sequences of the film where empty apartment
buildings are bombed as though they were on a battlefield, and where a cut from cars to
tanks suggests a kind of militarized driver and vehicle. But even where the connection is
not so obvious, we must recognize the intrusion of military priorities into the behavior of
civilians.
The movement of militarization away from spontaneity (which Virilio aligns with
ecology) and toward predictable control marks nearly every image of human populations
in Koyaanisqatsi. Flatly rejecting the American mythos surrounding the automobile as
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access to particular kinds of freedom, cars in Koyaanisqatsi are unfailingly under control.
Indeed what is shocking about the volume of traffic we see in Koyaanisqatsi is that we
never see a collision or hiccup in the unrelenting flow of cars. I do not mean to suggest
that a car crash is a viable answer to the question of where Koyaanisqatsi locates
liberation. What I want to suggest is that the uniformity of automotive behavior is an
example of the ways in which militarized mentalities seep into even the most banal
activities.

Figure 3.8
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Figure 3.9
Human behavior in Koyaanisqatsi always demonstrates a military impulse toward
predictable control and obedience that stems from a becoming-machine of the human
itself. Virilio specifies the relationship between mechanization and militarization as: “The
dialectic of war, delivered from passivity, demands of the military engineer an increased
effort in the technical domain, an effort centered on the suppression or replacement of
the human factor in the machine’s overall workings” (28-9). And so Virilio’s comments
show that as humans increasingly come to resemble machines—as they do throughout
Koyaanisqatsi—they become increasingly militarized. For Virilio, then, the military and
the environment comprise two opposed impulses marked by mechanization on the one
side, and by spontaneity on the other.
Although the implications of this arrangement might seem to result in a facile
“back to nature” ethos, Koyaanisqatsi complicates the picture by implicating the absence
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of leisure as part-and parcel of a culture accelerating toward mechanical militarization.
Failing to recognize the complexity of Koyaanisqatsi’s call for a life balanced by the
natural world is a disservice to the intensity of the film and the range of its images. And
although it is not my central concern here, the problem of Capitalism is, undoubtedly, in
play as well. Pietari Kääpä’s chapter “Transnational Approaches to Ecocinema: Charting
an Expansive Field” in the book Transnational Ecocinema directly addresses
Koyaanisqatsi’s anti-capitalist ecology. The film’s shift from expansive desert, cloud,
and aquatic images toward the business of traffic and urban images is in fact introduced
by work. More specifically, the film introduces work and humans simultaneously in the
process of exploiting the desert’s ecosystems for coal-fired energy. (Glen Canyon Dam,
incidentally, features prominently in one scene of Koyaanisqatsi and is an important
fixture of the recent documentary Dam Nation (dir. Ben Knight and Travis Rummel,
2014) which explains why the dam was built and the ways in which the energy it
produces and the revenue it generates fuel even more ecologically damaging projects.)
Koyaanisqatsi is a film that has radicalized the idea (however unstable or
misguided from a Deleuzian or Derridean point of view) that art is a mirror held up to
reality. The film embraces this task in several ways, but perhaps the two most obvious
ways are the significance of the title, meaning “life out of balance”, which encourages
viewers to use the film to help pinpoint a few of the problems with modern urban life,
and Koyaanisqatsi also courts the status and power of the mirror in the curiously repeated
sequences of people staring into Reggio’s camera. Often the people’s faces are impassive
and inscrutable. Some peoples’ eyes dance sporadically away from the camera, as though
the intensity of the moment, the stare down, is too much for them to handle. But one
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particularly curious moment witnesses a man shaving on a crowded public sidewalk. This
marvelous moment literalizes and metaphor that art is a mirror of the world. Reggio’s
camera is like one-way glass where viewers can see through to the other side, but the
film’s subjects see only their reflection.

Figure 3.10
The image of this old man shaving in front of Reggio’s camera is not only an invitation to
see the film as a reflection of the world on the other side of the lens, it also raises an
important question about the camera’s place within the world it films. And it is in
precisely this context that despite its sobering and frightening images of lockstep,
mechanical behavior where there seems to be no leisure time for off-the-clock activities,
Koyaanisqatsi does manage to show us spontaneity. In this sense, Koyaanisqatsi is a
literal imaging of Francesco Casetti’s statement that “The cinema succeeds in laying bare
the subtle logic at the foundation of the ‘mechanism’ of the modern world…On the
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screen…we see what we have become” (85). (Even if this mechanical becoming arrives
on screen a couple of decades in advance of the cinematic nadir of drone films.)
In several sequences of Koyaanisqatsi, passersby lock eyes with, and respond to
Reggio’s camera. Their responses often register surprise, puzzlement or discomfort.
Cinema actually intrudes into the world it documents as a disruption to mechanical
predictability. The presence of a camera is met with the knowing smirk of a woman who
looks like she’s sharing a private joke with those of us on the other side of Reggio’s lens.

Figure 3.11
Even suspicion of the camera, such as we find the expression of a man walking
alone on the sidewalk, qualifies as an admirable and spontaneous response to cinema’s
intrusion into his world. The man’s slightly raised right eyebrow, though furrowed in the
middle, and the inclination of his head, tilted to continue his examination of the
documentarian, seem not to trust the camera. Could we imagine such suspicion among
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anyone among the throngs of people riding the escalators? And has our present relation to
cameras become so accustomed to the omnipresence of cameras and so “Inured to
endless closed circuit TV, we have lost the shock that ought to greet” (Cubitt 16) a
stranger filming us?

Figure 3.12
To my mind, suspicion of cameras—much as I love them—has perhaps become a radical
response that registers their power and that simultaneously flies in the face of the
passivity toward cameras the marks not only the mechanical behaviors Koyaanisqatsi
brings to bear, but also the uncritical neutrality that allows our current culture to have
become so accustomed to cameras that we hardly notice them or what they do. Reggio’s
time-lapse editing cannot shoulder all of the blame here. Earlier in the film we see many
people sitting in traffic on Los Angeles’ freeways—in slow-motion nonetheless—and no
one seems to feel much of anything, let alone something like suspicion. Only when the
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camera becomes something that interacts with the world do we see anything like
spontaneity in Koyaanisqatsi.
Another memorable scene where bystanders engage the camera occurs on the Las
Vegas strip where six cocktail waitresses hold the camera’s gaze. Some of the women
fidget, some have to occasionally look away, and the woman furthest left is fighting back
a smile the whole time. The camera produces discomfort perhaps because it interrupts
work. The women are all dressed in their work uniforms, and without tasks to carry out,
the camera’s presence creates an interval of time resembling leisure. But the women do
not seem to know what to do with it.

Figure 3.13
Perhaps the most simple example of the camera’s presence introducing
spontaneity into the world of the film is when a man walking in Times Square—which
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even in 1983 hosts countless distractions to the eye—actually turns around to get a
second look at the camera; it is as though for this man cinema’s intrusion into the world
completely disrupts the routine and predictable scene of mechanically single-minded
pedestrian traffic and advertisements in one of the most famous tourist sites in the world.

Figure 3.14
What is remarkable about Reggio’s film, however, is not just its implicit commentary on
what Western capitalist society has become—namely a world defined by mechanical
traffic of all kinds whether automotive, pedestrian, or economic, where neither leaving
the workplace nor the nighttime hours after most peoples’ workdays have finished, ushers
in a time of leisure. What makes this critique truly radical is that Reggio places it within
the contexts of the environment and the process of militarization.
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One of the most striking cuts in Koyaanisqatsi is an aerial tracking shot
displaying row upon row of cars. Although the cars are multi-colored, this image alone
confronts viewers with a glimpse of mass-produced anonymity underlying the myth of
the car-as-individual-freedom. But Reggio cuts from this image to stock footage of an
arsenal of tanks, and the cultural critique becomes much more complex. The montage
suggests that we ought to be more suspicious of car culture, not because of how much
cars come to resemble one another, but because of the much more frightening revelation
that they resemble tanks. The implication of this critique is that as urban society
increasingly casts people as faceless cogs in the city’s machinery, they come to resemble
soldiers: simply put, Koyaanisqatsi traces our culture’s uniformity along the lines of
militarization.

3.4.

Drone Films and YOU

One crucial difference between Koyaanisqatsi and the drone footage that
circulates online, stems from a basic lesson from Althusser which he calls the recognition
function of ideology. An encounter with ideology strikes us with a certain amount of
“obviousness” that seems to require no investigation; when we are confronted with a
dominant ideology, we respond by “crying out (aloud or in the ‘still, small voice of
conscience’): ‘That’s obvious! That’s right! That’s true!’” (46). The recognition function
lies precisely in the rush to obvious consensus which falsely reassures subjects that there
is no need for further questioning or investigation: “the ‘obviousness’ that you and I are
subjects—and that that does not cause any problems—is an ideological effect” (46). The
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preclusion of questioning is why ideology is in fact at its most nefarious when it pretends
to be non-ideological. Althusser succinctly warns readers that “what thus seems to take
place outside ideology (to be precise, in the street), in reality takes place in ideology”
(49). Drone footage of Chernobyl or of dolphins at Dana Point wants very badly not to
confront viewers with any ideological questions. The comment from Althusser about
ideology moving around “in the street”, incidentally, lends the problem of the recognition
function a particularly documentary significance. And so the impassive, disinterested,
and mostly unedited drone documentary films are exactly where we ought to be most
concerned about the ideology they purvey.
Viewers of “Drones in Pripyat (Chernobyl)” are meant to enjoy the eerie stillness
and dilapidation of Chernobyl without having to confront any hard questions about why
they allow themselves to be romanced by graceful images of destruction—or even
questions about nuclear energy or species depopulation. (Still less are viewers meant to
see the site of the Chernobyl meltdown through drone footage as a mass grave.) And the
popular dolphin video is about enjoying the surprising numbers of dolphins in the frame,
their spontaneous emergence from beneath the Pacific’s surface, and it is also about
enjoying the drone’s graceful movement through the air, regardless of what it films.

! 59

Figure 3.15
This last point about the camera’s movements producing a particular kind of enjoyment
is, of course, is a very old and perhaps not very novel concept. The iconic sequences
featuring The Overlook’s hotels hallways in The Shining are only possible because of the
Steadicam’s technological advancements, allowing Kubrick to uninterruptedly film
around corners. Going even further back, F.W. Murnau’s The Last Laugh is one of the
very first films to use the “Entfesselte Kamera” technique, allowing the camera to move
at all while filming. The “unchained camera” creates all kinds of shots which we take for
granted today (the tilt, pan, tracking, etc.) But the consequences of drone technology do
very little to advance cinema, and in some sense actually destroy it.
Drone films rely upon two distinct characteristics for their visual enjoyment: first,
they attempt to create a sense of weightlessness or flight simulation in their images.
Second, drone films re-present familiar spaces or objects to us in what Arnheim calls an
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“unnatural” way. But whereas Koyaanisqatsi also relies upon these two mannerisms for
its visual enjoyment and impact, drone films almost never display any principles of
editing. In fact, drone films seem to seek an end to editing.
In the example of the “Drones Over Dolphin Stampede and Whales off Dana
Point and Maui” video, the drone is the star of the film. To some degree, the film could
be recording anything, and the attraction would still be the drone. Of course it is pleasant
to look at the dolphins breaking the surface of the water, but viewers are not invited to
remark their athleticism, their gracefulness, or even (more simply) the animals’ beauty.
What we are invited, instead, to appreciate is the vista afforded by the drone which
dolphins happen to enter, or complement. Rather than interrupt this view with cuts,
montage, etc. drone films merely survey what they record. They do not invite what
Arnheim calls “true observation” in the way that Koyaanisqatsi does. In this capacity, the
drone is essentially a tool of surveillance, not cinema.
What makes the drone film different from other kinds of popular film
entertainment is its dismissal of editing. Eisenstein once located “the essence of cinema
not in the shots but in the relationship between the shots” (69)—or in other words, in
editing. Even the most conventional and uninspired Hollywood action picture abides
Eisenstein’s proclamation as the intensity of action sequences often results from the
rapidity and rhythm of cuts. Perhaps it is unfair to measure drone films against
Eisenstein’s standards; one could argue for their cinematic merit as a technological
innovation of the long take. However, drone films also disappoint the ideas of André
Bazin, champion of the long take as an improvement on montage. Bazin argues that the
technical requirements for filming long takes with a large depth of field (he cites Wyler
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and Welles as models) “affects the relationships of the minds of spectators to the image,
and in consequence it influences the interpretation of the spectacle” (Bazin 35). These
results, however, seem to be more lofty than what we can expect from a drone film,
where viewers’ attention inevitably gets turned back onto the drone itself. In other words,
the advent of depth of field and the long take in the 1940’s allowed viewers access to new
ways to experience motion pictures; drones on the other hand allow viewers only access
to new applications of drones.
Koyaanisqatsi actually uses its own editing principles of montage to proleptically
warn viewers about the kind of images produced by cameras attached to drones. Near the
very end of the film, Reggio’s camera mimics the kind of aerial shot that has become a
signature of drone footage to survey an urban landscape. Because of a stunning cut, the
montage makes the argument that drones image their subjects as military targets.
.
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Figure 3.16

Figure 3.17
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It is not by coincidence that Reggio chooses Detroit as the initial urban landscape at the
start of this sequence. The easily recognizable headquarters of General Motors is a kind
of synecdoche for the city itself. Because of economic hardship, Detroit already looks as
though it has been bombed. (Recall that earlier in the film, there are several scenes of
Detroit’s abandoned and skeletal buildings.) Reggio then cuts from Detroit to an
anonymous thermal image of a city from the same height, cutting from a drone-like view
of the city to a military one, although the visual similarities between the two are
alarmingly similar. From the thermal image, Reggio then cuts to equally similar shots of
computer circuitry.

Figure 3.18
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Figure 3.19
This linkage, the urban-military-machine, marked by the elimination of leisure and
spontaneity serves as a warning about the nature of drone films. This warning is possible
only through Reggio’s editing decisions, where the montage beginning with an overhead
view of Detroit divides and develops into an image of a computer’s guts. I would argue
that recognizing and reflecting on this warning is totally in keeping with the kind of “true
observation” Arnheim describes as a by-product of cinema’s capacity to induce
“unnatural” vision. Although Arnheim’s writing rests within a humanist context, I read
this concept as perhaps a kind of proto-posthuman idea without interchanging one-to-one
the terms “unnatural” and “posthuman.” Koyaanisqatsi, in any case, ascribes a
posthuman valance or significance to the concept Arnheim articulates.
The shared characteristics between drones and military surveillance are
accentuated further by contrasting drones with the sequences in which Reggio’s camera
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interacts with its subjects. Drones do not interact with their environment. and so cannot
achieve the kind of spontaneous exchanges and interactions I mention above, which Paul
Virilio characterizes as a fundamental connection humans have with the ecological.
A horrifying report from 60 Minutes from August, 2009 titled “Drones: America’s
New Air Force” emphasizes the US military’s predator drones’ undetectable presence: as
she searches the sky, correspondant Lara Logan explains “Even though I know there’s a
Predator over head, I still can’t hear a thing. Pretty much like an insurgent on the ground
in Afghanistan, or in Iraq. And if you look up, to the exact spot we’re told the Predator is
flying right now, there’s nothing but clouds and blue sky.” Logan also details just how
efficiently lethal drones are. She seems to almost admire the massive bomb affixed to the
drone, “but the most important weapon,” Logan claims, “is the aircraft’s million-dollar
camera.” As a military instrument, cameras on drones certainly have the capacity to
envision any and all filmed subjects as military targets. Not only does Logan remark how
similar she is to an “insurgent” in the quotation above, the report also demonstrates the
drone film’s inclination to see any space as a battlefield: “This barren, mountainous
landscape may look like Afghanistan, but in fact it’s just forty-five miles north of the Las
Vegas strip on the edge of the Mojave desert.” At one point, Lieutenant Colonel Chris
Gough confronts the question of how “engaged” military personnel are with combat if
they are operating a drone from thousands of miles away from the actual battlefield with
the following statement: “There are arguments that we aren't as engaged in the war. I've
heard those arguments. And I can tell you that - and I'm happy to tell ya - that I've never
been more engaged in a conflict in my life.” But this response acquires frightening and
sinister implications when one considers the ways in which drone cameras have the
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capacity to ignore the distinction between civilian and soldier, combat zone and national
park, news reporter and insurgent. (“Drones: America’s New Air Force”). We may not
have as-yet incorporated drones into our daily, civilian lives, but all signs point to their
proliferation. But, regardless of what will become their stated use or purpose, we have
already carved out a predatory and military role for drones’ future—the best-known
drone is, afterall, named the Predator.

3.5.

Conclusions

Lev Manovich’s comments on the explosion of digital media since the advent of
the internet argue that “In computer culture, montage is no longer the dominant aesthetic,
as it was throughout the twentieth century, from the avant-garde of the 1920’s up until the
postmodernism of the 1980’s. Digital compositing, in which different spaces are
combined into a single seamless virtual space is a good example of the alternative
aesthetics of continuity” (144). As I have argued, Koyaanisqatsi invites viewers to
investigate what the loss of montage means vis-à-vis militarized societies and drone
footage. Drone films are antithetical to any principle of editing. Drones are about
surveilling targets and so what was once described as the “arbitrariness” of the
photographic frame has been replaced with a particular kind of military purpose. A
second point here is that drone films never feature cuts. They are always a perversion of
the long-take from a camera whose engagement with the world it films is predatory.
Another consideration of the quotation from Manovich is the ambiguity of his use of the
term avant-garde. Does he mean Vertov—who figures as a kind of hero figure for his
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book? Vertov’s seminal Man with a Movie Camera came out in 1929. Or, does Manovich
mean the surrealist films of people like Dalí and Buñuel, whose equally seminal Un
Chien Andalou was also released in 1929? Of course the principles and tactics of
montage are equally at work in both, and so deciding between the two is something of a
moot point. But I want to bring surrealism into the discussion here as another kind of
cinematic history that drones destroy when they replace montage with surveillance.
Koyaanisqatsi is certainly more intimately related to Vertov’s work and style, but one
could see Koyaanisqatsi’s insistence on the importance of montage as a kind of
ambassador for all kinds of film history.
Koyaanisqatsi relentlessly challenges viewers to interrogate their inclinations
toward mechanical and therefore militarized behavior. As the film specifically recalls The
Lumière Brothers’ seminal “Workers Leaving the Factory” it suggests that this modern
tendency presents an affront to leisure. For students of film theory, this threat extends to
the very foundations of cinema itself per Sean Cubitt’s analysis of “Workers Leaving the
Factory.” And for students of Posthumanism and posthuman thought/philosophy,
Koyaanisqatsi poses a crucially important question: how does one become posthuman
without becoming a tool for military manipulation? Of course there are several facets and
frontiers of posthuman thought, but many of these trajectories are intimately bound up
with the impulse toward militarization. Biotechnological advancements in prosthetics and
neuroscience, for example, have been profoundly accelerated as a response to veterans of
the disastrous imperial war in Iraq. Likewise, the cybernetic face of Posthumanism seems
to be even more suspect as an avenue toward Posthuman liberation considering Edward
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Snowden’s alarming revelations of widespread (and illegal) federal surveillance of online
activity.
The etymology of “spontaneity”—which Virilio links inextricably to ecology as a
descriptor of the environment’s behavior—offers an alternative pathway toward
Posthuman liberation from Humanist discourses that do not work in service of an
increasingly militarized world. The second entry for “spontaneity” in the OED says that
the word was once belonged to the realm of “voluntary action or movement on the part of
animals (or plants.)” Rather than becoming machines, we would do well to think
seriously about becomings-animal.
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CHAPTER 4. PHOTOGRAPHY, ANIMALS, AND DIGITAL CIRCULATIONS

4.1.

Introduction and Becoming-Animal

A popular work of fiction among scholars who work in the field of Animal
Studies is J.M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals. The book’s bold and captivating
protagonist, Elizabeth Costello, brazenly praises animals’ linguistic quietude:
“Generation after generation, heroically, our captives refuse to speak to us” (25). The
question of speech, where animals are concerned has constituted in the history of
philosophy a fissure along which humans and animals are divided. But rather than enter
into a debate over the technicalities of whether animals such as dolphins or whales, for
example, actually do have language, Elizabeth Costello transforms animals’ “lack” of
speech into a radical protest that does not name what it sees.
Costello’s words are fascinating first and foremost because they short-circuit an
anthropocentric impulse to “elevate” animals to the status of humans by demonstrating
how “like us” they actually are. This impulse manifests itself in many ways—as for
instance in the basic cable channel Animal Planet’s motto “Surprisingly Human”—but no
matter the intentions behind it, this impulse is always a disservice to animals themselves
because the logic that structures this impulse holds that only humanoid beings are worthy
of ethical or political consideration. (This is a point that Costello herself brings up vis-à-
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vis the question of rights.) But Costello’s declaration that animals “heroically refuse to
speak” not only refuses an anthropocentric ethic, it also opens a pathway for thinking
about combatting human-centric responses to art. Although “refuse” here implies that
animals have language, and simply do not use it, I read Costello’s sentiment as an attempt
to think animals’ silence in radical, productive, and positive terms. The idea that animals
have language in the first place might be an anthropocentric attitude, but Costello’s
admiration for their silence is a slap in the face of the idea that language somehow makes
humans superior to animals.
Animals’ refusal to become humanoid through speech strikes me as echoing the
sensibility of Roland Barthes’s declaration in Camera Lucida that “Such is the
photograph: it cannot say what it lets us see” (100). Although Barthes language here falls
back on the question of ability, the photograph’s non-linguistic transmission becomes a
kind of occasion for Barthes to celebrate photography generally. Akira Mizuta Lippit’s
book, Electric Animal, concretizes this argument by pointing out that the “contact
between language and the animal marks a limit of the very function of language. The
proximity to the threshold of language is a trait common to animals and to another
medium, photography” (Lippit 163). And although many other writers (including John
Berger and his famous essay “Why Look at Animals?”) have established a certain
connection between animals and photography, much remains to be explored about how
what this connection makes possible, especially with regard to its potential to affect the
humans who look at and engage with photographs themselves.
In the case of both the animal and photography, the intriguing silence of each
offers up an opportunity to engage the world with the senses, sensationally, as opposed to
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with the mind and the larynx exclusively, and to inherit the responsibility inherent in
sharing suffering. The refusal to speak bonds animals and photographs in an unlikely
alliance with one another where neither position is interchangeable, but where they
complement one another in order to create an opportunity for what Donna Haraway has
called “sharing suffering” in her book When Species Meet (75-7). This alliance and its
effects of sharing suffering in turn answer a challenge issued by Derrida in The Animal
that Therefore I Am to “open the immense question of pathos…of suffering, pity, and
compassion” (Derrida 26) in ways other than the victimizing images of animal suffering
circulated by so-called animal rights organizations. The question, then, is what comes to
be exchanged between human and animal through the mute photograph and how this
exchange happens.
The relationship between animals and photographic images has been theorized in
a number of ways; I am not the first writer to consider their entanglement. Most
commonly, the shape of this scholarly conversation tends to be ethical. Jonathan Burt’s
book Animals In Film points out the ways in which for the earliest photographers and
filmmakers, “[c]apturing animals on film presented technological challenges, which in
turn reinforced the novelty of film via the animal’s own potential for novelty and its
power to fascinate…film locates questions of the place of the animal in modernity at the
junction where technology and issues of the treatment of animals meet” (86-7). And this
reinforcement becomes explicitly an ethical concern for Nicole Shaukin where her book,
Animal Capital, indicts film and photography where as early as Muybridge and the
Chicago World’s Fair, “a kino-eye can nevertheless already be glimpsed working
alongside animal disassembly and reconstituting it as a moving image…the rise of
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cinematic culture was also literally—materially contingent on mass slaughter” due to its
reliance upon gelatins for photo-chemical development (103). And yet for all the disgust
and outrage of Shukin’s book, she never pauses to actually look at the things she rails
against—films and photographs. (Even as she tosses in the term kino-eye, she mentions
Dziga Vertov only second-hand.) And looking is undeniably important. Not only because
looking is the sensory arena where we come to meet photography, but also because as
Lippit argues, “Animals can be seen as predecessors of photography, the two joined by
the ecstatic feature of their look” (Lippit 183). Lippit’s phrasing here is both intriguing
and ambiguous. I take “ecstatic feature of their look” as an encapsulation of the ways in
which both photography and animals each have the capacity to call attention to the
delight of vision itself. Even images of sadness or pain sensitize viewers to the power of
vision. Each time I see, for example, Nick Ut’s photograph of Kim Phúc running naked
from a cloud of Napalm, of course I experience shock and sadness as a response to the
image, but I also register the way in which vision is the vehicle by which I approach these
responses. Regardless of the image one beholds, there is indeed a kind of “ecstasy” in
vision’s capacity to affect so instantly and so intensely.
The history Shaukin traces never treats an image as something to look at, or given
the syntax of Lippit’s idea, to look with. In Shaukin’s analysis, photographs (or perhaps
any image) is always and only a commodity. Her argument that the assembly (and
disassembly) line associated with “Fordism” accounts for the rise of film culture at least
in part depends upon the misguided idea that images are merely and only commodities to
consume. And while I respect her attempt to think through the relationship between
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animals and photos through a kind of Marxist materialism, her work leaves many
important conversations unexplored.
The question of looking must be addressed, included, and enmeshed into the
ethical concerns raised by the majority of scholarship on animals and film in order to
honor both the art of film and photography and the importance of their theorizations. In
John Berger’s famous essay, “Why Look at Animals”, which is not only about
photography, but animals and visual culture broadly, Berger argues that the Nineteenth
Century’s invention of the zoo, where “people go to meet animals, to observe them, to
see them, is, in fact, a monument to the impossibility of such encounters. Modern zoos
are an epitaph to a relationship which was as old as man” (21). Looking at animals in
zoos “even if the animal is up against the bars less than a foot from you, looking
outwards in the public direction, you are looking at something that has been rendered
absolutely marginal” (24). And so there is a serious ethical question to consider here:
what violence allows me to see? For zoos (not exclusively, but certainly emblematically)
the answer is fairly straightforward. Marginalization supplants relationship and prevents
any kind of encounter with animals that is not structured by domination. But what about
images of animals? Discussing photography, Berger writes, “owls or giraffes, the camera
fixes them in a domain which, although entirely visible to the camera, will never be
entered by the spectator. All animals appear like fish seen through the plate glass of an
aquarium” (16).
The problem Berger’s analysis poses, then, is how to look at animals in such a
way that resists the violence of looking that marks the zoo experience. The task is to
create a visual link between humans and animals that answers Derrida’s challenge to

! 74
“open the immense question of pathos…of suffering, pity, and compassion” productively,
in such a way that actually bridges the chasm between human and animal effected by
zoos. This is a challenge rarely taken up by ecocinematic scholars. Jennifer Ladino’s
essay, for example, “Working With Animals: Regarding Companion Species in
Documentary Film” clearly recognizes how important is the question of looking, raised
by John Berger. Ladino states that “ [she is] inspired by not only by the rich body of
scholarship on looking at animals by John Berger, Derek Bousé, Cynthia Chris, and
others but also by Laura Mulvey’s classic essay ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’
which prompted me to think about nonhuman animals as the ‘to-be-looked-at’ objects of
the camera’s ‘speciesed’ gaze” (130). There is a distinct problem with this kind of
approach. Despite her skepticism toward what she calls a “speciesist camera [that] sees
animals through human eyes” (130), she ends up doing little more than inducting animals
into a theoretical discourse that is fundamentally human. Being “inspired” by Mulvey’s
essay, and the identity politics it perpetuates, means writing about animals as though they
were marginalized humans.
And so limiting a critical response to the representation of animals cannot
approach animals from anything other than an anthropocentric point of view. Not only
does this kind of approach fail to meet Derrida’s challenges in The Animal that Therefore
I Am, it also has to qualify—by Ladino’s own terms—as speciesist. And so rather than
focus on representation, a better approach might concern itself with transformation.
Transformation and metamorphosis are integral to a lot of the collaborative work by
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, and their concept of becoming-animal, as outlined
most vividly and extensively in their magnum opus A Thousand Plateaus offers
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ecocinematic writing one possible pathway for transformative encounter that does not
consider animals as marginalized humans. Instead, becoming-animal allows animals to
transform the writing and thought of the human: “[t]here are animal becomings in
literature which do not consist in talking of one’s dog or cat. It is rather an encounter
between two reigns, a short-circuit, the picking-up of a code where each is
deterritorialized. In writing one always gives writing to those who do not have it, but the
latter give writing a becoming without which it would not exist” (Deleuze and Parnet 44).
I am not certain about the idea that writing always gives writing to those who do not have
it, but even if that is true, I am suspicious of the way I which the idea quickly resorts to a
conception of writing as nothing more than (or nothing more transformative than)
advocacy. And the stakes are fairly high where animals are concerned because since
animals do not have language to begin with, speaking for animals maneuvers animals into
humanist attitudes about language as a prerequisite for rights. Deleuze and Guattari
actually modify this sentiment in What Is Philosophy by making a crucial distinction
between speaking for and speaking before another, but my focus here is on the ways in
which photography allows human viewers to pick up a “code” that emanates from
animals that short-circuits anthropocentrism.
One of the things, however, that makes working with Deleuze and Guattari’s
concepts difficult is the way in which terms and concepts overlap with one another and
refine one another. To invoke any one concept is to open the door to the whole network
of concepts in Deleuze and Guattari’s idiom because they are connected to one another
like elements in a molecule or tubers in a rhizome. The liberatory “line of flight,” for
example, requires a movement of deterritorialization. Deterritorialization, in turn, brushes
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up against Deleuze and Guattari’s unique conception of desire, which opens up a
discussion of the Body without Organs. Setting aside the over-simplification and coarse
summary, my point here is that these concepts sprawl, and their tendency to open onto
other concepts makes the task of writing about or working with a particular concept
difficult. So the work that follows is not meant as an exhaustive or comprehensive
discussion of becoming-animal and images. Instead, I hope to illuminate a particular kind
of visual exchange that a few particular aspects of becoming-animal make possible.
The majority of Deleuzian film scholarship tends toward a few well-worn
discussions: faciality, psycho- and schizo- analysis, or an explication of the concepts
outlined in Cinema 1 and Cinema 2. (See for example, Bogue in Deleuze on Cinema and
Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema ed. Ian Buchanan and Patricia MacCormack.).
The essay “Losing Face,” for example, by Gregory Flaxman and Elena Oxman (the third
chapter of Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema) is much more valuable to the study
of philosophy than it is to the study of cinema. In essays such as these, cinema is
subordinated to a mere tool of philosophy, valuable only insofar as it serves philosophy’s
purposes. I would argue, however, that the concept of becoming-animal, which Deleuze
and Guattari develop more thoroughly in A Thousand Plateaus than anywhere else, might
actually elicit more lively and productive responses to moving and still images than the
more common approaches mentioned above. I find the fact that Deleuze and Guattari
introduce the concept of becoming-animal in a cinematic context more than coincidental.
Granted, the discussion of Willard that begins the chapter closely resembles the position I
just criticized insofar as Willard offers an “example” or an image of the concept they
want to develop. However, the general shape that becoming-animal takes in the course of
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A Thousand Plateaus’ longest chapter is significant for the study of film because it
theorizes a model of vision (an accomplishment that marks some of the very best film
theory) that participates in philosophy and film equally.
Early on in “Becoming-Animal…” Deleuze and Guattari make very clear the
argument that becoming has nothing to do with imitation, filiation, or resemblance. They
write that “resemblance, on the contrary, would represent an obstacle or a stoppage”
(233) impinging upon the movement of becoming-animal. The question, then, is how to
conceptualize that movement, if resemblance and imitation are false starts. Deleuze and
Guattari’s offering of contagion, symbiosis, and especially the idea of “unnatural
participation” prove to be the most useful ways to describe the movement of becominganimal where cinema and photography are concerned. I recognize that this is not a
complete or exhaustive definition of becoming-animal, but I am willing to overdetermine
them here in order to highlight their possibilities for an eco-film theory.
Placing these aspects of becoming-animal into discourse on film and photography
engenders two distinct effects: on the one hand, photography and films image these
concepts, and move Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts out of abstraction and make them
more accessible. On the other hand, imaging becoming-animal promotes new kinds of
responses to images themselves. Although Henri Cartier-Bresson is known most as a
street photographer, his images often feature animals in ways that not only invite my
Deleuzian response, but also in ways that avoid the humanist discourses that relegate
animals to inferior subject positions and thereby miss out on the politics of sharing
suffering in Haraway’s idiom, and the liberatory flight of becoming in Deleuze and
Guattari’s.
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4.2.

Henri Cartier-Bresson’s Nose

Writing about becoming a professional photographer, Cartier-Bresson recalls
“from the moment that I began to use the camera and to think about it, however, there
was an end to holiday snaps and silly pictures of my friends. I became serious. I was on
the scent of something and I was busy smelling it out” (20, emphasis mine). It is curious
that Cartier-Bresson describes the process of becoming a serious photographer,
“dedicating [him]self to Art with a capital ‘A’” (21), in terms of using his camera to
smell or sniff out his images. It may be easy to hear such a description as a half-joke, or
as a way to evade betraying the secrets of the Artist’s actual process, but CartierBresson’s words suggest exactly the opposite; he likens smelling out photographs to
taking photography seriously, and dedicating himself to the craft. (Indeed thinking
seriously about animals in any context can easily and often come across as a joke, as in
The Animal that Therefore I Am’s last chapter, called “I don’t know why we are doing
this.” And even if Derrida takes animals seriously, the closing section of his book
registers the possibility that a reader might not.) It would be a mistake, however, to evade
what thinking seriously about animals and photographs has to offer.
Bresson’s photo of pigs taken in Holland invites viewers to consider the ways in
which animals and humans share habitats. The photo takes us to a farm within a
sprawling landscape. The pigs’ enclosures seem too narrow for the animals within. Front
and center in the photo is a brick, house-like structure that almost seems to be an echo of
the farmhouse that although out of frame, is undoubtedly near-by. But the most important
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quality of the photo is that it captures two of the five pigs with their front legs atop the
front of their enclosures, peering out over them. (Counting from foreground to
background, a fifth pig’s ears are just visible behind the pig looking out of the pen.) The
demonstrative posture of these two curious pigs may initially strike viewers as charming.
Noses held high, the pigs could almost pass for sailors who have spotted land. The pigs
communicate a keen awareness of an exterior; they are drawn toward the space beyond
their brick boxes. The photo may amuse viewers—indeed we ought to appreciate the
personality of the pigs and their curiosity.

Figure 4.1
The charm of the photo, however, performs a function that does much more than
simply entertain viewers with “cute” pigs. The photo allows viewers to share in the pigs’
confinement, and thus their suffering. The photo’s—and the pigs’—charm depends upon
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a mutual understanding of confinement and longing between the human viewer and the
pig subjects. For Akira Lippit, “Identifying with the animal is part of the process of
becoming-animal” (180) as he links animals and photography together near the end of
Electric Animal. Cartier-Bresson, writing again about how to take photographs, argues
that “We must respect the atmosphere which surrounds the human being, and integrate
into the portrait the individual’s habitat—for man, no less than animals, has his habitat”
(30-1). The photograph of the pigs is a visual expression of this argument. Certainly the
pigs, at least in part, constitute “the atmosphere which surrounds” whatever farmers also
inhabit this space. Yet the photo shows us no farmers, so the pigs are definitely the
subjects of the photo. And in fact, being charmed by the photo’s the demonstrative pigs
modifies the quotation slightly, making the “no less than” qualifier a moot point. Being
charmed by pigs that want to see the world beyond their enclosure presupposes a sense of
enclosure on the part of the charmed.
This exchange between pig subject and human viewer, the mutual sense of
confinement, and the apparent desire for exterior space beyond cloistered stalls, these
requisite exchanges between pig and viewer for experiencing the photograph hold
important implications for the question of becoming-animal and images. In contrast to
filiation or resemblance, Deleuze and Guattari propose that becoming-animal is (at least
in part) the result of “not pity, but unnatural participation” (240). It will be helpful here,
to clarify the concept of “unnatural participation” as it will become an increasingly
important concept for this chapter.
For me, the concept of unnatural participation directly confronts the question of
how images operate within an animal and ecological context. Why should a photograph,
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an arbitrary frame, cause a human subject outside of the photograph to share in a sense of
animal enclosure? Susan Sontag argues that “photography is essentially an act of nonintervention” (11) but careful consideration of the relationship between animals and
images complicates Sontag’s claim. As Sontag’s ideas indicate, it is easy to think of the
photographic subject as confined and trapped within the image, but Cartier-Bresson’s
photograph of animal captivity surprisingly locates captivity within both the subject and
the viewer. And although Cartier-Bresson photographs the pigs, rather than intervening
on behalf of their liberation, intervention occurs nevertheless, but not where one might
expect. Rather than either the photographer or the viewer, it is the photographic subject
that intervenes into the life of the viewer: looking at the image pushes viewers to
participate in an unnatural sense of confinement inaugurated by the cuteness and charm
of the pigs themselves. I call this process unnatural for several reasons.
First, the humanist (read anthropocentric) discourses Derrida critiques in The
Animal that Therefore I Am would undoubtedly make the claim that the conscious,
thinking-therefore-being human has every right to confine un-conscious and poor-inworld animals. From this point of view, then, it is not natural for the human subject to
participate in the animal’s confinement. Secondly, Cartier-Bresson’s photograph enacts
an unnatural participation between two disparate temporalities; that of the photograph
and of the phenomenological world of the viewer. We often describe being taken aback
or fascinated by a photograph as being captivated, but Cartier-Bresson’s photograph
literalizes the captivating postures and expressivity of the pigs: to be captivated by this
photograph is to share, even slightly, the captivity of the pigs within the photo which
comprises a becoming-animal that originates from several unnatural participations. Thus
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the post- or non-human concept of becoming-animal, enacted by Cartier-Bresson’s photo
short-circuits the discourse that relegates confinement to animals, and duly contradicts
the idea the phenomenological, ecological world of the viewer remains untouched by the
worlds within images. Becoming-animal, by way of an unnatural participation,
constitutes a particular kind of ecological vision for the study of film and photography.
Cartier-Bresson’s photo, and his writing about photography, initiate a becominganimal that operates along the lines of what Deleuze and Guattari call contagion that
performs another function in addition to the ecological vision that exchanges the sense of
confinement from pig to human. This ecological, becoming-animal, mode of vision also
allows the important question of pathos and animals, raised by Derrida in The Animal
that Therefore I Am, to be approached without recourse to humanist discourses that
privilege human over animal life. According to Derrida’s deconstruction, such discourses
victimize animals, wage war against them, or understand animals as (supposedly) lacking
what humans have—namely language and reason. (Of course, such discourses were
sharply criticized long before Derrida’s intervention, notably in Jeremy Bentham’s
writing, which Derrida recognizes: “Bentham said something like this: the question is not
to know whether the animal can think, reason, or speak, etc., something we still pretend
to be asking ourselves…and this question determines so many others…The first and
decisive question would rather be to know whether animals can suffer. ‘Can they suffer?’
asks Bentham simply yet profoundly” (Derrida 27). Cartier-Bresson’s photograph asks
viewers to share in some sense of the suffering of animals without perpetuating the
violences of anthropocentric discourses that would speak for animals, or the
anthropomorphism that would “give” language back to animals and force them to speak.
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It is, however, important to note that becoming-animal is not an equation or
substitution, it is more of a movement, a transmission, or even an attraction. In the
example from Cartier-Bresson, being charmed by the pigs transmits the shared misery of
enclosure from pig to human. The sharing does not necessarily have to be distributed or
experienced equally to be meaningful, and Donna Haraway questions the very prospect
of what an “equal” relationship between humans and animals might be, and whether such
a relationship is either possible or productive for minimizing the suffering of animals in
her book When Species Meet. Haraway argues that sharing suffering “must be lived and
developed inside unequal, instrumental relations linking human and nonhuman animals in
research as well as other sorts of activities” (84)—I count photography, both taking and
viewing photos, as one of those “other activities” and one of its best attributes is that
photography remains at ease (like Elizabeth Costello) with animals’ refusal of speech.
PETA’s images of animal suffering, on the other hand, attempt almost exactly the
opposite gesture. They proceed from the assumption that animals need to speak, and they
attempt to speak for and in the place of animals with images that attempt to display
suffering in such a way that merely assaults viewers, rather than an image that invites
viewers to share suffering. The result here is that PETA’s images and their attempts to
speak for animals participate in a philosophical war against animals that assumes human
existence is a standard or ideal, and that animals are mere victims that lack language.
Sharing suffering requires an encounter, an exchange, or a participation that engenders it.
Returning for the moment to Electric Animal, Lippit details a philosophical
tradition of defining the human against the animal through philosophy’s suspicion of the
sense of smell. For many animals, especially dogs, for example, the sense of smell
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amounts to an “epistemological basis for the dog’s existence” (122). And philosophy has
in the past sought to displace this epistemology. Lippit reminds us that for Horkheimer
and Adorno, “smelling stirs up the recollection of distant and shameful forms of
existence” (123). Read in conjunction with Freud’s comments on smell, these past forms
of existence are clearly animal: “Freud also charts the emergence of humanity from the
olfactory world of animals by following the movement of humanity away from the sense
of smell and toward that of sight” (123 emphasis mine).
What I find fascinating in Lippit’s reading of Freud is that the development of the
biological category we call human charts a particular movement regarding the importance
of the senses; according to the logic philosophy has outlined, we become increasingly
human as we place a higher (epistemological and sensory) value on sight, and learn to be
skeptical of smell. This is a fairly outcome of philosophy’s attempt to define the human.
The disavowal of smell as an embarrassing evolutionary holdover, reminding humans of
their animal origins can be understood easily enough. In keeping with the discourses of
humanism, culture and civilization have allowed (some of) us to achieve comfortable,
urbane existences that have erased from our memory and experience the squalor and
struggle to survive that marks the world of animals. But the premium on vision, as an
index for what counts as human is puzzling. Comparatively speaking, one does not have
to look long or hard to find animals whose ocular faculties are far superior to ours. Many
varieties of birds immediately spring to mind, but even dogs—the animal that Lippit’s
discussion begins with—often have keener senses of sight than we do. So where has
vision’s superiority taken us? Perhaps the advent of photography represents a triumph of
what human technicity and culture can accomplish as it privileges sight over smell.
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If seeing is believing, then Cartier-Bresson’s declaration that he “smell[s] out” his
photograph radically bends the trajectory of human experience back toward animals by
theorizing his Art on the basis of using smell as his primary engagement with the
environment he photographs. Smelling out a photograph, therefore, describes a
becoming-animal that has nothing to do with filiation or resemblance but through the
nose’s unnatural participation in the visual.
It is worth noting the Cartier-Bresson’s pig photograph does not homogenize the
animals it features. Without a doubt, my eye is drawn immediately to the pig nearest the
foreground. Likewise, Deleuze and Guattari allow for variation within a pack: “wherever
there is multiplicity, you will also find an exceptional individual, and it is with that
individual that an alliance must be made in order to become animal” (243). “That the
anomalous is the borderline makes it easier for us to understand the various positions it
occupies in relation to the pack or the multiplicity it borders” (245). Without a doubt, the
“anomalous” pig is the one who stands the highest, the one that is especially charming,
the one most amenable to the impulse (however dubious) to anthropomorphism, who
stands at the threshold between containment and freedom, between the striated space of
the enclosure and the smooth space of the pasture. And it is this anomalous pig that acts
as a conduit, relaying the shared sense of containment and enclosure between the human
viewer and the ungulate pack. This becoming-animal inaugurated by Cartier-Bresson’s
photograph opens up a new way to think about the relationship between images and
politics that avoids predictable and tired conversations about representation.
Like Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts, the effects of photographically becominganimal have their own sprawl. Deleuze’s concepts are not “individual” or “isolated.” This
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kind of becoming-animal verges on the ethics of speaking-before mentioned in
“Geophilosopy” from What Is Philosophy? This, however, is a political response that
sidesteps the trappings of discourse limited to representation. Representation, of course,
is too closely related to the obstacles to becoming posed by resemblance and imitation.
One of the models for what could be provisionally called “subversion” or “politics”
Deleuze and Guattari favor is contagion. The idea of contagion gets the majority of their
attention in A Thousand Plateaus in the chapter “Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Intense,
Becoming Imperceptible” It is not a mere coincidence, however, that contagion comes up
in A Thousand Plateaus in the context of both cinema and becoming-animal. Looking at
Cartier-Bresson’s photograph of pigs leaves me with the distinct feeling of having been
not only exposed to but infected with the enclosure that marks the lives of the pigs.
(Exposure, coincidentally being a key term for both immunology and photography,
echoing the idea that becoming-animal operates through a process marked by contagion.)
Describing the effect of an image on viewers as contagion ascribes a political context to
photography in Deleuze and Guattari’s economy of concepts that evades the politics of
representation. Instead, what contagion allows for is what Artaud calls the “occult life” of
an image accessible within images—“But we have to know how to divine this occult
life…To use it to tell stories, a superficial series of deeds, is to deprive it of the finest of
its resources, to disavow its most profound purpose…What is certain is that most forms
of representation have had their day” (Artaud 104). Although Artaud means by “most
forms of representation” the various art forms that predate photography and the cinema, it
resonates nicely with the sentiment of Slavoj Žižek’s argument that “the struggle for
liberation is not reducible to a struggle for the ‘right to narrate,’ to the struggle of
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deprived marginal groups to freely articulate their position” (190). In contrast (but
perhaps not necessarily in opposition) to representation, telling stories, or narration I want
to insert encounter, sensation, and contagion as terms to describe a viewer’s relationship
to an image—in other words, divining and conjuring, which are the two words preferred
by Artaud and Deleuze and Guattari.
The “occult life” Cartier-Bresson’s photo invites viewers into pierces (even if
only partially of temporarily) the border between human and pig, an occult photographic
life that radically rejects the privileged status of language in order to put human viewers
into contact with non-human suffering. According to Deleuze and Guattari,
representation, as opposed to contagion, asks the wrong questions: “the question,
therefore, is not whether the status of women, or those on the bottom, is better or worse,
but the type of organization from which that status results” (A Thousand Plateaus 210).
The politics of representation might argue that circulating the horrific details of animal
suffering in images such as PETA’s might improve animals’ living (and dying)
conditions. “If only they knew…” as the expression goes, when in fact, we know very
well that animals suffer, but easily disavow it because such photos are only contagious in
terms of a shock-value that has very little to do with animals themselves. CartierBresson’s photo, on the other hand, invites humans into contact, or unnatural
participation with, animal suffering, suggesting a poignant organization resulting from
the marginalization of animals: perhaps if we were unwilling to allow animal suffering,
we might also refuse to tolerate human suffering—not because humans are superior to
animals and thus deserve better treatment but because of how easily the border between
us can be crossed.
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As a point of departure from Cartier-Bresson, I would like to include an example
of the kind of images that work toward exactly the opposite effects. Rather than enact any
becomings, productively open the question of pathos, or inaugurate any politics of
sharing suffering, animal photographs that circulate online, in social media often
foreclose the liberatory possibilities of these concepts. Of course, any analysis along
these lines is going to require some cherry-picking as there is no way to work
“comprehensively” with online animal images. So what follows is some analysis of
animal photographs which are representative of the kinds of images which get widely
circulated in a variety of online platforms.

4.3.

The Social (Media) Animal

Conversations about social media platforms, academic or popular, tend to obsess
over the question of social media’s impact on human, face-to-face relationships. And
while these are important conversations to pursue, perhaps more thought out to be given
to social media’s impact on human-animal relations. Buzzfeed.com, for example, devotes
a significant chunk of their site to animals specifically. Regularly updated, visitors to this
portion of the site will encounter images of unlikely breeds (pit-bull-dachshund mix,
e.g.), unlikely behaviors, and unlikely feats. On January 28, 2015, however, buzzfeed
posted a series of images taken from a blog called “RaisingTheRuf” that merit careful
consideration vis-à-vis the question of digital human-animal relationships.
RaisingTheRuf.com is named for Rufus, a three-year old Pharaoh hound located
in Santa Monica, CA. The blog consists of photographs and videos of Rufus in various
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scenarios of make-believe because, according to the “About” section of the website,
written supposedly in Rufus’ voice, “My mom hopes these photos and videos make you
smile as big as I do.” (One of Rufus’ tricks is to pull the corners of his mouth back into a
“smile.”)
Sara Rehnmark, Rufus’ “mom” photographs Rufus and runs the blog. Typically,
her photos are taken while Rufus sleeps in order to guarantee his docility and complicity
with Sara’s project. Although these photos in no way involve physical harm to the dog, I
want to highlight their inherent and arrant violence as they replicate and image the worst
forms of Humanist thought and dominance over non-human life.
As I mentioned above, the majority of RaisingTheRuf’s photos are taken while
Rufus sleeps. On the one hand, this is a practical decision because the scenes into which
Rufus is inserted are elaborate and require precise positioning for their verisimilitude and
desired effect. Consider, for example, this domestic scene where Rufus appears to be
hanging a photo on a wall:
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Figure 4.2
I would argue however, that Rufus’ sleep is much more than a practical concern: rather
than initiate a conversation about the miracle that non-human species also share in the
experience of dreams, RaisingTheRuf capitalizes on canine sleep as an occasion to live
out Humanist dreams of “restoring” language and technicity to animal being. One of the
classic arguments for maintaining a clear division between human and animal life centers
around tools. The Humanist logic of this argument holds that humans can fashion and use
tools, animals cannot. And while few people might hold rigidly or absolutely to this
divisor between humans and animals, its sentiment has certainly not died out entirely.
Thus a well-intentioned, but ultimately Humanist animal-lover hopes we will smile to see
the image of a dog-as-tool-savvy-homemaker, brightening up a home not through its
presence, but through its keen sense of interior decorating.
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In fact, this image (like most of the blog) actually forbids animal existence as
such. Rufus, apparently, exists here as an interior decorator, worth looking at only
because of his ability to use tools. Close examination shows that Rufus appears to be
hanging a picture of himself. This makes perfect sense, according to the logic that
occasions the photograph. If Rufus is going to become a humanoid interior decorator,
then his tastes should mimic a human’s. Thus we see Rufus displaying his fondness of
portraiture, hanging a framed picture of himself, posed in front of some birch trees. And
this portrait suggests a second way for Rufus to occupy photographic space: as décor.
Because he is inert, sleeping, this photo, typical of the entire blog, reduces Rufus’
corporeality to the status of a prop. The docile body of the sleeping dog is as manipulable
and inanimate as the drawing featured in the frame.
By imagining Rufus as both a tool-capable interior decorator, and simply as
décor, the photograph ends up disavowing the animality of the animal. Both the
photographer and the viewer know very well that Rufus is a dog, but what if her were a
decorator? What if her were décor? The question arises, then, why is Rufus the dog
unbearable to look at? There can be no doubt that RaisingTheRuf got onto
Buzzfeed.com’s radar by virtue of its elaborate and unique vision for animal
photography. And so any popularity the blog enjoys results directly from it having
achieved its goal of making visitors smile. Why do both the photographer and viewer
smile wider at photos of a dog as anything-but-a-dog than at photos of a dog? Once our
philosophers asked “Why look at animals?” but RaisingTheRuf forces us toward
regression, asking instead: “Do we look at animals?”
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4.4.

Why Look at Slaughterhouses?

The question concerning animals and photographs extends far beyond political
and philosophical discussions of rights. The way our world responds to each term in this
unlikely alliance—animal and image—promises serious and material consequences for
animals, images, and humans alike in the world we all share. The legal implications of
this alliance are clearly spelled out in the recent spate of so-called “Ag gag” bills
appearing in US State legislations in recent years.
Perhaps one of the reasons the environmental movement was slow to take hold in
the United States is because of the inability—or unwillingness—for separate individuals
to understand themselves as part of a network of connections to the ecosystems that
surround them. Food, and a couple of recent Idaho and Indiana state senate bills, provides
an apt context for considering how the relationship between humans and the environment
breaks down. Consumer culture and the industrialization of agriculture have widened the
gaps between what we eat, where our food comes from, and the ecological effects of its
production. For the average consumer, the relationships between these things are
nebulous at best. In some instances in fact, gaining access to and learning about the
places our food comes from is becoming increasingly difficult. Recent legislation in the
United States, such as Idaho Senate Bill 1337 and Indiana Senate Bill 101 seek to
criminalize entrance into and filming facilities that produce meat. Such legal measures
deliberately restrict access to the places food comes from, presumably to maintain a
dubious status quo where the animals people eat are treated in an unsavory fashion.
These kinds of bills are alarming for a number of reasons. The most obvious point
of contention here is that they restrict the meat industry’s accountability to the public, and
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they restrict the public’s access to the learning about meat production. These restrictions
widen the ecological gulf that separates people from the process by which their food
arrives to them by keeping meat production invisible. Marx’s crucial concept of the
commodity fetish immediately springs to mind as a way to highlight the importance of
knowing where, by whom, and how the products we consume are produced. But in the
instance of meat, divided neatly into serving sizes and wrapped cleanly in glossy saran
wrap, the alienation that divides consumers from product adds problems such as antibiotic resistant disease and ecological damage to the familiar Marxist concerns for factory
conditions, wages, etc. In fact, disrupting the feedback loop of commodity fetishization
where ignorance of production encourages guilt-free consumption is entirely within the
power of the cinema. Dziga Vertov, the Soviet filmmaker and film theorist described his
kinoks’ goals thus: “Our basic, programmatic objective is to aid each oppressed
individual and the proletariat as a whole in their effort to understand the phenomena of
life around them” (Vertov 49). In the context of Idaho Senate Bill 1337 and Indiana
Senate Bill 101, the factory farms and large agricultural businesses that no doubt fund the
politicians who drafted the bills perhaps recognize the relationship between images,
animals, the environment, and capital better than most film and ecocritical scholars—
hence legislative efforts to stem documentary images of the production of meat.
In addition to concerns about restricted access, these legislative measures also
strangely link humans who would investigate meat production with the animals that will
become meat insofar as both people and animals remain powerless in the face of industry.
(The human and animal positions here are by no means interchangeable, but there
remains a certain vulnerability shared between the two as they are subject to the will,
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procedures, and whims of the meat industry.) Secondly, these state senate bills imagine
images as threats to an industrial status quo that creates a miserable existence for animals;
the implication is that filming compromises the industry’s sovereignty over animals.
According to Idaho SB 1337, “A person commits the crime of interference with
agricultural production if the person knowingly…[e]nters an agricultural production
facility without the facility owner’s express consent or pursuant to judicial process or
statutory authorization, makes audio or video recordings of the conduct of an agricultural
production facility’s operations” (l.11-28).
Again, the bills create an unlikely affiliation. Here they align images with
animals in the sense that the meat industry seems to be able to address animals and
images exclusively through containment and subjugation. These intriguing affiliations are
of course in addition to the numerous studies that have been published linking the
production and transport of meat to ecological damage and climate change. But here is a
current and political context that summons research combining ecology, animals, and
Film Studies. Of course these so-called “Ag gag” bills should be struck down, but the
implications of the alignments they imply have the potential to create new relationships
between humans, animals, images, and the environment that might revitalize these
disciplines’ capacity to address the ecological crises that haunt our future.
If the constitution of individuals keeps people estranged from the environment,
then it also keeps people estranged from images. Watching a film or viewing a
photograph as a discrete individual, as a Cartesian subject, permits the viewer to keep the
image at a safe distance. The implication is that because a film is not “real” it doesn’t
affect the individual. But of course many scholars who work intimately with cinema and
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photography wholly reject this mode of viewing. For example, in Gilles Deleuze’s
Cinema 2: The Time-Image, Deleuze combats the idea that images occur at a removal
from the world by arguing that responses to images “[indicate] the relation between man
and world, between man and nature…Cinema seems to have a real vocation in this
respect” (161). Elsewhere, Deleuze intensifies this argument wit the idea that “Restoring
our belief in the world—this is the power of modern cinema” (172). I understand
Deleuze’s use of the word belief to describe the relationship between cinema and the
world as analogous to the relay or collision between novels and the world that Deleuze
and Guattari describe in the “Rhizome” chapter of A Thousand Plateaus where they
argue “contrary to a deeply rooted belief, the book is not an image of the world. It forms
a rhizome with the world” (11). The point is that for Deleuze, works of art do not seal
themselves off from the world as mere representations of it; they are neither mirrors held
up to the world nor well-wrought urns that unify the tensions they create. Works of art
are part of the world, and they connect to the world in order to alter it. The idea that light
and images on a screen participate in the world off-screen is the sense in which I read
Deleuze’s use of the word “belief.”
This idea seems to be fairly well-established in film studies and visual culture.
Ron Burnett argues, for example, in his book How Images Think “images are virtual
because they are distant from the spectator or user but are experienced as if that distance
could, and in some instances, must be overcome” (72). The nature of this “experience,”
however, the structure of what Deleuze calls “belief”, must be read as ecological.
Discussing the relationship between the world of photographs and the world of the
viewer, Susan Sontag uses ecology both literally and metaphorically to theorize a way of
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bridging this divide: “[i]mages are more real than anyone could have supposed. And just
because they are an unlimited resource, one that cannot be exhausted by consumerist
waste, there is all the more reason to apply the conservationist remedy. If there can be a
better way for the real world to include images, it will require an ecology not only of real
things, but of images as well” (180). Belief in this world, in terms of revitalizing the
connections between humans and the environment, is precisely what is needed to combat
the manifold forces that threaten the earth’s ecosystems, animals, oceans, etc. Belief in
the world, as precipitated by images requires a new way of looking. It does not make
sense to consider images as imitations of the world; rather, cinema and photography are
the manifestations of the world become image. Viewing films and photographs as the
world-become-images opens up an entirely new range of questions and experience. In
this sense, my research is about articulating an eco-film theory that maps vital
connections between images and the environment that are currently unexplored. Until a
transformative eco-film theory takes hold, film scholars will be unable to address
ecological problems and ecocritical scholars will continue to view films and photographs
as mere images of the world, rather than benefit from the idea that they are the world
become image.
Although John Berger’s essay “Photographs of Agony” primarily discusses
Donald McCullin’s reportage from the Vietnam War and those images’ effects on
viewers, Berger’s description of the dead and wounded Vietnamese bodies “bleeding
profusely with the black blood of black-and-white photographs” might just as well apply
to the animals of Blood of the Beasts. Berger argues that “The most literal adjective that
could be applied to [such images] is arresting” (42) and ironically, producing such
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images could now get one arrested thanks to the kinds of state senate bills described
above. One might object precisely at this moment that it is an ethical problem to conflate
the cost of human life with that of animal life. This is exactly the objection leveled
against Elizabeth Costello in a letter she receives in The Lives of Animals. According to
one of Costello’s critics, a comparison between human and animal slaughter (and
Costello even invokes the Holocaust “misunderstand[s] the nature of likenesses…[and]
insults the memory of the [human] dead. It also trades on the horrors of the camps in a
cheap way” (Coetzee 50). And while I do not altogether agree with either Costello or her
critic’s point of view, I certainly recognize the treachery of the comparison and its
potential to offend. What I would argue, however, is that this dichotomy, or dispute,
depends entirely upon a conversation that turn on rights. Rights-based appeals, of course,
are what Derrida takes to task as “pathetic” attempts to open the question of pathos where
animals are concerned. Blood of the Beasts, in this sense, deserves serious consideration
as a vast improvement upon those attempts, which reach their broadest appeal in PETAstyle films and photos.
Jeanette Sloniowski’s essay “‘It Was an Atrocious Film’ Georges Franju’s Blood
of the Beasts” sets out an apt comment on the overwhelming discomfort of the film:
The problem of a documentary like Blood of the Beasts is that it resists easy
classification as a moral statement about cruelty to animals, or humankind’s
survival at the price of the deaths of its fellow creatures, or even as an allegory
about the Holocaust…Franju’s film resolutely resists easy categorization. It would
be far more comfortable for spectators to suffer the pain of Blood of the Beasts if
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moral reassurance or a lesson learned was a clear and comfortable position when
the film had run its course. But Franju…sounds no morally reassuring note. (172)
From the Derridean perspective, however, the “problem” of classification as a moral
statement becomes an attractive attribute for Blood of the Beasts. As the moral statements
incline toward “giving” language to animals, the refusal to moralize can be seen as an
attempt to meet animals closer to their domain. Elizabeth Costello expresses a
complementary idea when assessing Ted Hughes’ poem about a jaguar: “when we divert
the current of feeling that flows between ourself and the animal into words, we abstract it
forever from the animal…It falls within an entirely human economy” (Coetzee 51).
Blood of the Beasts’ refusal to moralize or even narrate the fate of animals in the
slaughterhouse not only refuses the pitfalls of rights-based appeals, it also gives way in a
few fleeting moments to becoming-animal. (This is of course not to say that there is no
narration in the film, but that the narration concerns itself—and limits itself—entirely to
the purview of human experience: the trains, suburbs and churches outside the
slaughterhouse, the tools used by the men and women inside it, the methods of butchery,
etc.)
Rather than attempt to speak for animals, Blood of the Beasts affords brief
moments of becoming-animal, where human viewers encounter something of the
animals’ experience. One such instance is when we see animals forced inside the
slaughterhouse.
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Figure 4.3
In every instance, the animals resist; they enter not willingly, but as prisoners subject to
human force.

Figure 4.4
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Although slightly difficult to make out, this image shows cows simultaneously being
pushed and pulled into the space where they will be killed. In another moment, we see
cows being driven across a bridge, into the slaughterhouse, but the camera is placed
directly in front of the animals as they approach.

Figure 4.5
This is the crucial image. Being driven into the camera and being driven into the
slaughterhouse amounts to nearly the same thing. The film’s “exceedingly cruel and
violent images” make it, for Jeanette Sloniowski, “one of the most emotionally grueling
films imaginable” (171) and I would argue that this response is the result of a becominganimal where the horror and sadness of the cows’ failure to refuse entrance into the
slaughterhouse passes through the human viewer, registering as a failure to resist the film
itself. In this sense, Blood of the Beasts speaks before animals “not ‘for their benefit,’
or…‘in their place’” (Deleuze and Guattari 109) but by a “zone of exchange” where the
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suffering of the cows passes through the human viewer suffering through Franju’s film.
Again, the point here not at all to ask whether the suffering is equitable. They are not
equal positions of suffering, and only a rights-based, anthropocentric point of view would
raise the issue. The point is that the film manages to avoid precisely that question by
offering us an opportunity for becoming-animal.
This becoming-animal, the unlikely alliance between slaughtered animal and
sickened viewer (between the animals that will become meat and the viewers who eat it)
reaches its peak once the cattle are well within the slaughterhouse. Once they are inside,
we see two different cows examine their new surroundings with eyes that are wild and
upset—exactly the kind of eyes with which I am seeing the film. The cows stretch their
necks to try to look around in shock while being held down on slatted tables where they
will be killed.

Figure 4.6
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Figure 4.7
The panic in the eyes of the calves—being killed for veal meat, the narrator explains—
becomes my own as I watch their deaths and squirm. One cow, after being killed, seems
to stare directly into the camera. As a result of sharing something of the suffering of the
cow, I cannot help but see an accusatory look in the cow’s eye, motivated not by a
narrator’s moralizing but by a sense of betrayal. The image seems to recall, in an entirely
surrealist echo, the moment in Sherlock, Jr. when Buster Keaton, after discovering that
the audience has known he was alone on the motorcycle all along, looks back into the
camera with an expression of anger—a rare break in Buster’s famous deadpan.
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Figure 4.8

Figure 4.9
The questions asked by Blood of the Beasts, however, differs slightly from that of
Sherlock Jr. Buster Keaton’s look into the camera confronts viewers with the questions of
spectacle: why does danger entertain us? What does it mean to laugh at Buster’s peril?

!104
The dead stare of the cows in Blood of the Beasts, on the other hand ask viewers to
consider what it means to have seen everyday horrors that typically go unseen.
Discussing Franju’s film, Jonathan Burt reminds us that “it was filmed in a
different era, one in which the slaughter process was less mechanized” (Burt 175).
Indeed, in addition to the casually grotesque imaging of animal deaths and
disembowelment, Blood of the Beasts’ shocking effect also comes from the intensely
intimate work of the people within the slaughterhouse. The film describes the visual and
auditory conditions the workers inhabit: “In the deafening din of pneumatic hoists,
slaughterers and scalders work in the gray steam rising from the blood of the beasts.” (In
addition to the visual and auditory description, one does not need to work too hard to
imagine too an olfactory account of the slaughterhouse.) And yet, the men and women we
see on screen who work here show no signs of squeamishness; they work deliberately,
they whistle, they smoke cigarettes. This, I believe, is a crucial aspect of the film.
Attempting to alleviate the horror and discomfort the film induces, my eyes occasionally
find themselves moving away from the blood, organs, carcasses, and severed skulls and
onto the workers themselves—their faces, their movements in the background. However,
the visceral and intimate nature of their labor actually doubles down on the sickening
feeling that comes from the animal dismemberment. In the year 2015, with full
knowledge of factory farming, the shock of Franju’s film has evolved since it was first
released. What the film shows us, unsettling and awful as it is, may actually be seen by
viewers who care for animals with nostalgia. Nostalgia for a time when animals might
actually have enjoyed a less tortuous experience of this world than they now do.
According to Mark Rowlands, if you are a cow in the twenty-first century, destined to

!105
become beef, then “during the course of your life you can expect to be dehorned,
branded, and castrated without anaesthetic” (Rowlands 108). (This expectation has not
been chosen, by the way, for any kind of shock value. It is, sadly, representative.)
And the point here, is that Blood of the Beasts refuses to allow viewers to
maintain the disavowal that structures the consumption of animals (“Yes I know very
well that animals are treated brutally, but…”) Blood of the Beasts is a shocking disruption
to that disavowal but it is also nearly impossible to imagine it being made in 2015. The
so-called “Ag gag” laws—undoubtedly written and paid for by the meat industry—
restrict access to the kinds of procedures and conditions that have become even more
appalling in the decades since Franju took his camera into the Vaugiraud Slaughterhouse,
as meat production has become absurdly industrial and mechanical. Perhaps it is because
the days when people had to be intimate with the processes, sights, sounds, and smells of
“eviscerating” (in the idiom of Franju’s film) animals are over that cameras are not longer
allowed inside the slaughterhouse. What “Ag gag” bills ultimately cost us, then, is the
change to disrupt the feedback loop of ignorance and disavowal that sustains miserable
existences for livestock. We know very well that factory farming is cruel and brutal, but
if the “Ag gag” bills take hold, then there will be no modern Blood of the Beasts to open
up the question of pathos and animals. We will be stuck with rights-based images that
unwittingly work against the transformative becomings-animal that we badly need. In
short, we will not have the images which will ask us to believe in the world of animals.
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4.5.

An Unsightly View

Figure 4.10
On May 26 of this year, Chicago’s Sun Times newspaper’s website published an
image that seemingly instantly went viral on social media (“CPD Cops Posed for
Photo…”) Amid controversies surrounding police and the communities they serve
affecting places as disparate as Ferguson, MO, Staten Island, NY, Cleveland, OH, and
Baltimore, MD, the image showcases two white cops proudly holding rifles and crouched
over a black man wearing deer antlers. The photograph forces viewers to consider the
ways in which violence against animals permits violence against humans. The idea is not
new. Philosophical discussions about the difference between being killed and being
murdered have served as a way to highlighting the arbitrariness of who has rights in the
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modern world. Others, such as Derrida, point out that rights-based appeals for livable
conditions insufficiently address the problems at hand. This photograph, however, makes
a few visual links that pose important questions. Given the bulletin boards of tacked-up
lists, charts, and black-and-white wanted photographs, the photograph must have been
taken in a police station. But the hunting signifiers transform the police station into the
hunting lodge. And given the camouflaging tactics of police, whose cars in the Pacific
Northwest are typically forest or “hunter” green, in order to be masked by the region’s
lush flora, or whose vehicle make and model might be unmarked altogether in order to
blend in with civilian traffic, the photograph is not so much a perverse and inappropriate
reference to hunting so much as it literalizes the cop-as-urban-hunter status quo to an
appalling and disquieting degree. And most obviously, the hunted, the killed-but-notmurdered life form, aligns the racial minority with the animal along two oppressive lines
of what I will reluctantly deem thought. Firstly, the idea is that animals are inferior
beings. And thus reducing the black human to the status of animal produces an insult that
makes possible the second line of thought which is that as an inferior being, the black
man is subject to both the superiority and violence of the white man authorized by the
state to carry a gun (hunt.) The photograph enters into circulation in the midst of a
cultural moment where citizens are mobilizing their objections to how their communities
are policed, but the Sun-Times article dates the photograph to “between 1999 and 2003”
(Main and Janssen). And although the offending officers attempted to keep the
photograph under wraps, its relationship to both the past moment in which it was taken
and the present moment of widespread dissent gives it a ghostly or spectral quality that
Derrida describes as “Enter the ghost, Exit the ghost, Enter the ghost as before. A

!108
question of repetition: a specter is always a revenant. One cannot control its comings and
goings because it begins by coming back” (11).

4.6.

Hauntology and the Problem of Inheritance

As early as 1945, André Bazin laid a modest foundation for a non-human
conception of photography in his famous essay “The Ontology of the Photographic
Image”: “[t]oday the making of images no longer shares an anthropocentric, utilitarian
purpose. It is no longer a question of survival after death, but of a larger concept, the
creation of an ideal world in the likeness of the real…All the arts are based on the
presence of man, only photography derives an advantage from his absence” (10-3).
Bazin’s original context for these remarks has to do with his response to the idea that the
camera mechanically and automatically reproduces the world, which is distinct from, for
example, painting, where the brushstrokes, creation of colors, and style reflect an overtly
human hand rendering the subject. Whereas in photography, Bazin allows that the
selection and framing of the world might reflect or be determined by a human eye, but
the actual process of reproduction does not. But these remarks have the capacity to
illuminate more than the literal recording of light by a camera. Put into an ecological
context, Bazin’s theorizing invites one to consider what a non-anthropocentric
photography might make possible.
I would argue, of course, that Henri Cartier-Bresson’s photograph of pigs,
alongside his own theorization of photography, and Georges Franju’s Blood of the Beasts
at least partly answer the question. (Certainly the way Bresson diminishes the
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photographer’s intrusiveness with recourse to animal metaphors decenters whatever
anthropocentrism a photographer might perpetuate without heeding Bresson’s advice.) In
Bazin’s idiom, Cartier-Bresson’s directions asking photographers to look at the world
like an animal might derives an advantage over anthropocentric photographs such as
those on RaisingTheRuf.com, an advantage that creates a photographic space for or
encounter with what Deleuze and Guattari call becoming-animal.
Smelling out a photograph anticipates a kind of animal epistemology described by
Akira Mizuta Lippit thus: “[f]or animals, the foundations of perception and cognition
(and perhaps even affect) remain entrenched in an atmosphere determined by odors”
(124). The intimacy shared by photography and animals reaches a kind of apex for Lippit
in what he calls the “animetaphor…the unconscious of language, of logos” (165). Lippit
anchors his animetaphor to Derrida and the project of deconstruction where in “Plato’s
Pharmacy” Derrida writes “Logos is a zoon. An animal that is born, grows, belongs to
phusis” (as quoted in Lippit 165).
I want to conclude this chapter with an argument that runs parallel to Lippit’s.
Whereas Lippit appeals to Derrida in order to emphasize the importance of photography’s
relation to animals for language (logos) in the animetaphor, I want to appeal to Derrida
here in order to say something of the political dimension at work here concerning animal
images that open the question of pathos in valuable ways.
Derrida’s most overtly political book is Specters of Marx, and for Derrida, it is the
spectral that prompts politics. The reason for this prompting is because the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989—for Western neo-liberalism—authorized a “dominant
discourse…on the subject of Marx’s work and thought…To the rhythm of a cadenced
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march it proclaims: Marx is dead, communism is dead, very dead and along with it its
hopes, its discourse, its theories, and its practices. It says: long live capitalism, long live
the market, here’s to the survival economic and political liberalism!” (Derrida 64). If this
neoliberal incantation is true, then it follows that Marxism has become a ghost, and,
ironically, this spectral state is precisely where Communism begins in The Communist
Manifesto’s iconic opening line. For Derrida, haunting inaugurates politics. To the
specter of communism, Derrida adds another famous ghost, King Hamlet, and the idea
that “the time is out of joint” (Hamlet 1. v. 191) to address the irony that pronouncing
Marxism’s death might be the time Marxism begins to haunt Europe.
As Derrida makes clear in the “Exordium”, what is at stake for this kind of
politics, an hauntological politics, is:
to learn to live with ghosts, in the upkeep, the conversation, the company, or the
companionship, in the commerce without commerce of ghosts. To live otherwise,
and better. No not better, but more justly. But with them. No being-with the other,
no socius, without this with that makes being-with in general more enigmatic than
ever for us, And this being with specters would also be, not only but also, a
politics of memory, of inheritance, and of generations.
If I am getting ready to speak at length about ghosts…it is in the name of
justice (xviii).
Derrida challenges readers here to attempt to fulfill the impossibly large, but urgent task
of creating a “better[,] [n]o not better, but more [just]” and livable world for the (animal)
other.
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Before I can begin to work with Derrida’s challenges and ideas, I must make clear
how I see animals and photographs entering into Derrida’s economy of terms. I do not
make a one-to-one substitution of animals for ghosts or specters. Likewise, I do not
consider photographs interchangeable with ghosts or specters. On the other hand, these
two terms, animal and photograph, put us living humans in touch with the ghostly. Akira
Mizuta Lippit actually begins his Electric Animal with precisely this point. Although
“‘Everywhere animals disappear,’ writes John Berger…animals never entirely vanish.
Rather, they exist in a state of perpetual vanishing. Animals enter a new economy of
being…[that is] considering modern technological media generally and the cinema more
specifically, spectral…modernity finds animals lingering in the world undead” (Lippit 1).
For Lippit, animals are becoming ghostly, which is not quite the same as ghosts plain and
simple. Where photographs and ghosts are concerned, Bazin, Barthes, and Sontag each
likewise touch upon the photographic connection to the ghostly or spectral. “Hence,”
Bazin writes photography demonstrates that “it is no longer as certain as it was that there
is no middle stage between presence and absence” (Bazin 97).
The important question Derrida raises in The Animal that Therefore I Am about
how to approach pathos without charting a pathetic course can begin to be answered by
photography and the spectral. Cartier-Bresson’s pigs, and Franju’s livestock offer two
opportunities for becoming-animal and these becomings offer human viewers some sense
of or belief in an animal’s world while bypassing the rights-based and pathetic attempts
to advocate for animals. If neoliberal arrogance reaches its fever pitch in the repeated
“incantation” (Derrida 64) proclaiming capitalism’s triumph over Marxism, then perhaps
the sorcery of the cinema and the sorcery of becoming-animal comprise counter-spells
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that decenter the rational human subject—or consumer of images—where the specters of
animals and photographs become hauntologies and the question of pathos is opened in
productive, radical ways. Because hauntology is about the problem of inheritance, and
not about the question of rights, hauntology asks us to think about politics in terms of
being: “To be, this word in which we earlier saw the word of the spirit, means, for the
same reason, to inherit. All the questions on the subject of being or of what it is to be (or
not to be) are questions of inheritance” (Derrida 67). A more just world where animals
are concerned, a world that avoids “the specter of catastrophic mass extinction” to borrow
Steven Jay Gould’s poignant phrase (Gould 1296), and a world that slows or even stems
the perpetual vanishing of animals, must quite literally be conjured up. Film and
photography are tools of conjuring. They conjure particular kinds of animals in the
viewer. This conjuring is made possible by becoming-animal where the memories of the
moviegoer rest alongside the memories of the sorcerer. They remember, perhaps,
transforming the world in such a way that makes it a better inheritance for whatever
species can survive into our future.
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CHAPTER 5. MEDIA ECOLOGY, THOMAS PYNCHON, AND A THEORY OF
ADAPTATION
!
!
!
5.1.

Introduction

There’s a small scene about a third of the way into Thomas Pynchon’s madcap
detective novel, Inherent Vice, where Doc Sportello’s friend and confidant Sortilège
introduces Doc to her boyfriend Spike. It turns out that Spike and his friend Farley
Branch “would take off on their bikes from time to tome looking for [documentary film
subjects], both discovering after a while a common interest in respect for the natural
environment, having seen too much of it napalmed, polluted, defolioated till the laterite
beneath was sun-baked solid and useless. Farley had already collected dozens of reels’
worth of Stateside environmental abuse” (104). There is a certain humor in the idea of
two Vietnam veterans palling around driving their motorcycles up and down California
shooting documentary film footage that’s all Pynchon. In Pynchon’s fictional worlds, it is
not unreasonable for a military man to also be a renaissance man. Geoffrey “Pirate”
Prentice, for example, proves himself in Gravity’s Rainbow to be an expert British spy,
evacuating Katje Borgesius out of Holland, and also a successful clairvoyant who has “a
strange talent for—well, for getting inside the fantasies of others: being able, actually to
take over the burden of managing them” (Pynchon 12). Lastly, it would be a travesty not
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to mention Pirate’s gardening prowess—the man grows bananas in London, enough to
sustain perhaps the most memorable meal in all of American literature: the “Banana
Breakfast” (8). But despite Pynchon’s unceasing sense of humor, the episode with Spike
and Farley does not elide the horrors of the Vietnam war. Spike introduces himself to
hippie Doc with shocking frankness that suggests more than a little regret: “Yeah, I’m
one of them baby killers” (103) and Spike’s introduction succinctly addresses both the
idea that Spike was probably not in Vietnam willingly, and that he was required to
perform horrifying tasks while there. In fact, the novel suggests that eco-documentary
filmmaking is Spike and Farley Branch’s way of coping with the psychological
difficulties of Spike’s post-war life.
I want to suggest that this small, seemingly throwaway scene in Inherent Vice is a
kind of seed or key for thinking about the frequent intrusion of cinema into Pynchon’s
fictions. Despite its dubious status within the majority of Pynchon criticism, the cinema
in Pynchon’s novels is not so simply an apparatus of mind control, a Frankensteinian
monster of the Inanimate, or a demon of entropic illegibility. Cinema is also an antidote
to the horrors of military duty; cinema is a vehicle of connectivity; cinema is a conductor
of ecological activism and activity. And although these arguments reach a kind of
pinnacle in Inherent Vice, they begin to take root in Gravity’s Rainbow.
Among the earliest points of critical discussion and fascination surrounding
Gravity’s Rainbow include mythology, science and mathematics, and cinema. Forty years
on, scholars from a wide variety of fields and backgrounds remain captivated by
Pynchon’s knotty, macabre, and hilarious work. And although the ideas and arguments I
will pursue below will occasionally run counter to critical consensus, I do not intend to
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work necessarily in opposition to extant criticism where Pynchon and cinema is
concerned. As many writers have highlighted, Gravity’s Rainbow often enmeshes cinema
into sinister plots of Pavlovian control, as is the case with the film made of Octopus
Grigory. Elsewhere, Pynchon’s cinematic writing comprises “perversions of time”
(Holmes 13), or they are “placed among the other cultural and scientific-technological
forces that have shaped modern consciousness” for better for worse (Marquez 167). And
more often than not, scholarly writing on this subject has favored the worse. What I wish
to accomplish here is additional—not necessarily oppositional—writing that puts
Pynchon’s “cinematic imagination” (Marquez 167) into a different, ecological (and more
positive) context. I say additional and not oppositional because I have no interest in
refuting the idea that the characters of Pynchon’s novel exploit cinema for malevolent
ends; there is no positive spin to put onto the operant conditioning of an octopus in order
to manipulate Slothrop, for example, or the violence suffered by actress Margherita
Erdmann on or off camera.
Pynchon’s fiction is undeniably complex, and the default critical tactic seems to
be for scholars to try and match Pynchon’s narrative complexity with theoretical
complexity. This approach, I would argue does a significant disservice to Pynchon’s
work. Certainly, Pynchon’s novels demand a certain rigor and sophistication, but rarely
do critical responses to Pynchon’s fiction address, mirror, or even register the joy, humor,
or fun of reading Pynchon. Pynchon is only partly the grave techno-phobe who writes
apocalyptic apocrypha for and about a doomed culture falling in love with its own
destruction. Only partly. Another aspect of Pynchon’s style and content spontaneously
breaks into song, enthusiastically laughs at its own bad jokes, and forges puns with
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admirable shamelessness. The oddball and slapstick impulses in Pynchon’s work are just
as crucial as the nightmarish and ominous ones. If the books weren’t wicked fun, how
would people make through the marathon lengths of Against the Day, Mason & Dixon, or
Gravity’s Rainbow? Too often Pynchon’s yes-even-the-kitchen-sink energy receives little
more than lip service from scholars, and too often the question of film elicits joyless
responses that betray both the cinematic spirit of Gravity’s Rainbow and the cinema
itself. Because critics tend to (over)emphasize the ways in which cinema is used as a tool
of control while piling on the theoretical elaboration, readers are left with extremely
complex scholarship that somehow simultaneously lacks nuance. I would argue that one
way to respond to Pynchon’s sense of humor and style is to re-think the ways in which
cinema enters into his fiction.

5.2.

Part 2, Episode 6

Roughly one third of the way into Gravity’s Rainbow, in a chapter that begins at a
party where “some merrymaker has earlier put a hundred grams of hashish in the
Hollandaise. Word of this has gotten around” (244) there is a short but representative
passage where Pynchon’s style and cinema are concerned. A man called Blodgett
Waxwing, “the meanest customer Slothrop has seen outside of a Frankenstein movie—
wearing a white zoot suit with reet pleats and a long gold keychain that swings in flashing
loops as he crosses the room with a scowl for everybody” engages the novel’s protagonist
Tyrone Slothrop in the following dialogue:
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“I want you to hold this for me, till I ask for it back. It looks like Italo is
going to get here before Tamara, and I’m not sure which one—“
“At this rate, Tamara’s gonna get here before tonight,” Slothrop interjects
in a Groucho Marx voice.” (246)
In his essay “The Cinematic Imagination in Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow”,
Antonio Marquez states: “[a]t its worst, Pynchon’s appropriation of movie clichés is silly
and capricious” (Marquez 166). But to me this characterization could not be further from
the truth. Pynchon’s silliness and capriciousness is part of what makes his novels so
great. Even in the brief exchange quoted above, Pynchon’s lively style shines brightly
enough to temporarily blind readers from the actual plot of the scene. In the midst of
trying to keep track of who Slothrop is talking to, what contraband he wants Slothrop to
hang onto, and why, I can’t help but be distracted by Pynchon’s spot-on imitation of a
Groucho-esque joke that compromises the uneasy feeling I probably ought to have about
Waxwing the raketeer’s intentions for the book’s hero. As the passage continues, the
narrator tells us that Waxwing
has been AWOL off and on since the Battle of the Bulge, and with a death rap for
that he still goes into U.S. Army bases at night to the canteens to watch the
movies—provided they’re westerns, he loves those shit-kickers…he’s been
known to hot-wire a general’s jeep just to travel up to that Poitiers for the evening
to see a good old Bob Steele or Johnny Mack Brown…he has seen The Return of
Jack Slade twenty-seven times. (246-7)
By the end of this compact episode, the film references go on to include a few more
icons: King Kong, a sympathetic figure for Gravity’s Rainbow who turns up often, and
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Errol Flynn, to whom the narrative voice of the novel compares Slothrop a number of
times.
If, as critics have suggested, Gravity’s Rainbow might be read as a film, then
perhaps it might benefit from some explication alongside film theory. André Bazin once
put forward the argument that “as good a way as any towards understanding what a film
is trying to say to us is to know how it is saying it” (30). This I think is a key approach to
thinking and writing about Pynchon that often goes unexplored in Pynchon criticism.
Pynchon’s style for this chapter is goofy, comical, and cartoonish. These effects are
achieved precisely through the narrator and the characters’ incorporation of film
references. And despite the madcap form the chapter takes, film operates here at a
number of subtly complex levels. Where it intersects with Slothrop, cinema works to
support the text and readers’ imagining what they’re reading. Slothrop’s impersonation of
Groucho Marx allows readers who know and love Groucho to come close to hearing his
punning of Tamara’s name. (Likewise, the physical comparison of Slothrop to Errol
Flynn helps readers picture the protagonist’s slender frame and wispy mustache.) Where
Waxwing is concerned, however, cinema serves as something more than an aid for
readers’ sensory relation to what a character may look and sound like. Instead, cinema is
a kind of obsession for Waxwing that he indulges in opposition to, or at the expense of
military duty. This nuance will become important for me later on in this chapter, but for
now I want to continue with the book’s specific connections to Bazin’s film theory.
At first glance, the statement from Bazin might seem to resemble the New Critics’
idealization of form matching content, and then perhaps there would be no need to
consult cinematic Bazin for ideas about literary Pynchon. Gravity’s Rainbow, however,

!119
entirely short-circuits the New Critical argument “[t]hat the primary concern of criticism
is with the problem of unity—the kind of whole which the literary work forms or fails to
form, and the relation of the various parts to each other in building up this whole
(Brooks 798). Pynchon’s work generally, but perhaps most of all in Gravity’s Rainbow
not only “fails” to unify its manifold plots and subplots into a unity, it actively rejects the
very impulse that prizes totality in the first place. In the introductory essay to his seminal
book of annotations on Gravity’s Rainbow, Steven C. Wiesenberger insists that “the
novel approaches, but avoids, closure. It combines the elegance of a preordained structure
and the unintelligibility of pure coincidence” (10-1).
The resistance to closure Wiesenberger emphasizes about the book is indeed
crucial to its themes and to the subject matter it engages. Part of the “approach” toward
closure, I would argue, is its encyclopedic inclusion of topics ranging from pre-war
English candies to the nitty-gritty detail of Pavlovian psychology—brushing up against
the linguistic transformation of Soviet-run Kyrgyzstan, German amusement parks, air
balloon travel, and Poisson distributions along the way. Another part of the “approach”
toward closure Wiesenberger mentions concerns mythology. And Gravity’s Rainbow is
full of mythology. Pynchon manages to create enough space for the Grimm fairy tales,
Teutonic myths, Christian myths, Kabala, and Herero myths to circulate and brush up
against one another in the course of the novel—occasionally referencing, re-telling, or
satirizing more than one at a time. (One good example of the ways disparate myths mix
with or brush up against one another is explained thoroughly by Wiesenberger’s
annotation on the character Gottfried. Not only does his name mean “God’s peace” in
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German, it is also “related specifically to the ancient Teutonic god Frey…a god of peace
and sexual love” (Wiesenberger 74).)
Gravity’s Rainbow’s resistance to closure, completion, totalization, unity, etc.
lines up very closely alongside Bazin’s essay “The Myth of Total Cinema.” Bazin’s essay
argues that the invention of cinema cannot be limited to economic, technical, or scientific
invention alone because, “[o]n the contrary, an approximate and complicated
visualization of an idea invariably precedes the industrial discovery which alone can open
the way to its practical use” (Bazin 18 italics mine). Bazin’s argument is that cinema’s
origins are not, as we might expect circa 1895, or in the work of Muybridge, the
Lumières, Edison, or Marey alone. Instead, cinema could just as easily have begun with
the “phenakistoscope foreseen as long ago as the sixteenth century” (Bazin 19). Bazin’s
point here is not to pin down the exact moment of cinema’s origin. Instead, Bazin is
highlighting the idea that the capacity to imagine cinema precedes its technical
achievement.
This reversal that Bazin highlights is closely linked to an important aspect of
Gravity’s Rainbow. Steven C. Wiesenberger sees many examples of what he calls
“hysteron proteron: a trope of backward motion, regression, and reversals of cause and
effect” (34). Most importantly for the novel, the famous V-2 rocket, around which the
novel is organized, was witnessed to explode before the sound of their arrival. Because of
the speed at which they fly (i.e. faster than the speed of sound), the rockets’ approach
could not be heard until after they had hit.
Somewhat fittingly, perhaps, I have drifted pretty far afield from the particular
episode I set out to explicate. However, the way cinema enters into that episode is not
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only typical of its inclusion throughout the novel, it also typifies the ways in which I read
cinema ecologically within Pynchon’s novel. What Part 2, episode 6 of Gravity’s
Rainbow suggests is that cinema occupies an important place not only with the cosmos of
the novel, but that its place informs and mediates some of its most crucial ideas about
interfaces.

5.3.

Gravity’s Rainbow and Media Ecology

Gravity’s Rainbow is a novel obsessed with interfaces. The novel’s opening
section, “Beyond the Zero,” introduces the preoccupation with interfaces in a variety of
contexts. The not-quite-extinct reflex of Pavlovian conditioning that mysteriously persists
“beyond the zero” of de-conditioning a given stimulus is in some respect the catalyst for
the entire novel as Tyrone Slothrop’s V-2 rocket-related erections are the focal point of
the novel’s action. Par for the course in Gravity’s Rainbow are séances in which death is
merely an interface between one modality and another, Tyrone Slothrop’s frequent and
paranoid obsession with the interface between what counts as plot (plotted by Them)
versus coincidence, and a tendency for the novel to use its characters, objects, or mise-enscène as interfaces between literary genre and convention—and even to use a given
object as a seamless interface between subplots and various casts of characters. Referring
to setting here as mise-en-scène is entirely deliberate because in many respects Gravity’s
Rainbow more closely resembles a film than a novel.
Many scholars who work with and study Gravity’s Rainbow note the frequency
with which cinema enters into the novel, and cinema’s general importance to both the

!122
novel’s plot and its meanings. Too often scholarly discussions of film in Gravity’s
Rainbow have only to do with Pynchon’s critique of technology and its proclivity for a
mechanized society. John R. Holmes’s essay “‘A Hand to Turn the Time’: History as
Film in Gravity’s Rainbow” argues, for example, that in Gravity’s Rainbow, “Calculus,
film, and fatalism are all perversions of time that Pynchon seems to want excluded from
his theory of history” (Holmes 13). Donald Larsson, one of Pynchon’s earliest and most
esteemed critics claims that “In fact most of Pynchon’s references to film have negative
connotations. There are some exceptions concerning animated cartoons and the more
anarchic comedians such as the Marx brothers and W.C. Fields, but for the most part,
cinema is associated with decadence, death, and questions of power and control. Going to
the movies is a form of false consciousness” (Larsson 103-4). Although it is not my
primary focus here, I would argue that Larsson’s statements are true—or truest—when
the novel is talking about films that only exist within the world of the book, and that
when King Kong, or Errol Flynn, to name two frequent references, come to the fore, the
cinema does not signify death, control, etc. Nevertheless, cinema enters into the novel’s
concern for interfaces in several ways and these entrances produce interesting, if
controversial results which usually go ignored in the majority of scholarly writing on
Gravity’s Rainbow. Victoria de Zwaan’s analysis in “Gravity's Rainbow as Metaphoric
Narrative: Film, Fairy Tale and Fantasy in Pynchon's Germany” is a helpful departure
from the kind of responses characterized by Holmes and Larsson. De Zwaan argues that
“[a]s Slothrop starts to live his life as if it were a movie, he comes to perceive himself as
a fictional character” (de Zwaan 157). And although this strategy does not in the end
work out well for Slothrop, it does point to a crucial aspect of Pynchon’s use of cinema,
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that is, as a tool or catalyst of transformation, the site or interface between two realities
within and beyond the novel.
Perhaps the crux of cinema’s status within Gravity’s Rainbow’s cosmos lies with
Alpdruken (or Alpdrüken, the umlaut inconsistently applied throughout the book),
Gerhardt Von Göll’s fictional film within Pynchon’s novel. Like many characters in the
novel, Gerhardt Von Göll (aka Der Springer) and his fictional film Alpdruken appear
sporadically, peppered throughout the novel. (Alpdruken, incidentally, is the most
obvious example of a film that only exists within the pages of Pynchon’s novel.) As
Steven C. Weisenburger’s annotative companion to the novel explains, the film’s title is a
splinter of the name of “[t]he dog in [Ned] Pointsman’s dream, Reichssieger von Thanatz
Alpdrucken…[who] has fragmented and the parts of his name now begin to
metamorphose…The term Alpdrucken derives from an old folk belief that the devil rode
men as if they were horses, so that by morning their ‘mane’ (hair) would be tangled and
their bodies dripping with perspiration” (229). The dog Pointsman dreams about is a
national dog show champion Wiemaraner. The easy interpretation of Von Göll’s film title
is that images are nightmarish. To varying degrees, Pynchon’s critics promote this
interpretation by appealing to the techno-phobic aspects of his work, and doubling down
on them where film is concerned. I want to suggest, on the other hand, a slightly more
nuanced and detailed interpretation. The title, Alpdruken places the nightmare of
domination into the cinematic register. Neither animals nor images are nightmarish, but
the way in which they become sites of domination definitely is. The etymological
connection to Grimm equates nightmare with being ridden like a horse. One might
suspect that a human transforming into a horse would be nightmarish, but Pynchon seems
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to be more or less at ease with blurring the distinctions between human and animal.
Pynchon seems to delight, for example in pigs. Slothrop not only has a pig companion
following him around “In the Zone”, but he even becomes a kind of ceremonial pig called
“Plechazunga, the Pig-Hero” (Pynchon 567). References to pigs (and especially to Porky
Pig) in Pynchon’s work has even precipitated a scholarly article devoted to the matter (“A
Note on ‘Porky Pig and the Anarchist’ in The Crying of Lot 49 and Gravity’s Rainbow”
was penned by Mark Irwin in 1991. Much more so than by blurred distinctions between
human and animal, Pynchon’s novels are disturbed by instances where human and
machine or organic and inorganic become indistinct from one another.) The nightmare in
Grimm is the domination and aggression implied by the “tangled…bodies dripping with
perspiration.” Where the Weimaraner is concerned, I would argue that his name registers
the nightmare of dog shows where animals are judged on their “ability” to be trained and
controlled by humans who exploit their bodies and behaviors for vain and meaningless
prestige. So in both etymological cases, Alpdruken signifies the nightmare of domination,
rather than of images. Besides clarifying the nightmarish qualities of Alpdruken, which
admittedly the cinema remains open to facilitating, what I want to investigate further is
the significance of cinema as a vehicle of transformation within the imagination of the
novel. It begins—even where cinema is at its most nefarious within the book—to acquire
a particular kind of (positive) ecological valence when considered in light of what has
come to be termed media ecology.
Following a gloss on Vandana Shiva’s concept of Earth Democracy, a concept
that attempts to place individuals within a broad context that pays homage to “the Indian
concept of vasudhaiva kutumbakam, [meaning] Earth Family” (López viii), Antonio
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López’s book The Media Ecosystem lays out a provisional definition and raison d’être
for media ecology:
[b]ecause corporate media and gadget companies promote technological
‘progress’ while excluding living systems from our awareness, organic media
practitioners are charged with the responsibility of incorporating an Earth
perspective into their engagement with media ecosystems…As a space of
appearance that shapes our interconnected reality, the mediasphere can make
visible the spirit of the Earth. (López viii-ix)
Despite the occasionally awkward phrase (“organic media practitioners”, “Earth
perspective”, etc.), López’s ideas here comprise an ecological response to the problem of
a Liberal Human subject, whose sense of individuality is propped up by media that
“exclud[es] living systems from our awareness” (López viii).
Gravity’s Rainbow thematizes this concern over an individual functioning within
various systems memorably. With a smile that’s perhaps a bit too wide, the book never
quite allows its main character Tyrone Slothrop (or readers) to know for certain whether
the events and encounters that befall Slothrop are plotted for him by shadowy bureaucrats
or “‘Random.’ A tragic, actressy smile…‘Another fairy-tale word’” (Pynchon 395). The
scene that includes this quotation happens to occur in a movie studio, where Alpdruken
was filmed and the conversation is between Slothrop and a once-famous (within the
novel) German actress called Margherita Erdmann, who starred in Alpdruken. Not only
does the fictional film function in the novel as a connective passage from two distinct
eras of German history, it also provides a semi-literal backdrop to the crucial theme of
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Slothrop as a possible or probably pawn, manipulated and plotted against—where
randomness is a fairy tale.
The friendship between Slothrop and Erdmann is central to the novel, but cinema
enters into discussions of interfaces, and travelling through them, likewise in moments
that only seem insignificant or fleeting: “Kevin Spectro did not differentiate between
Outside and Inside. He saw the cortex as an interface organ, mediating between the two,
but part of them both. ‘When you’ve looked at how it really is,’ he asked once, ‘how can
we, any of us, be separate?’ He is my Pierre Janet, Pointsman thought…Here’s a medium
shot, himself backlit, alone at the high window in the Grand Hotel, whisky glass tipped at
the bright subarctic sky…” (142). Here again the novel takes recourse to the cinema—or
at least to cinematic language—in order to mediate between the two sides of an interface.
The place, however, where cinema comprises an interface between two realities
most strikingly in the novel is at the end. As Pynchon’s massive novel draws to a
climactic close, the novel lifts readers out of 1945 Germany and plunges them back down
into 1973 Los Angeles. The shift the novel’s setting is absolutely shocking. It is shocking
even despite the jokes and anachronisms that point outside the time and space where the
novel is set. Nevertheless, after roaming through seven hundred pages literally “In the
Zone” of Europe during the days immediately following V-E Day, suddenly reading
about the nuances of Los Angeles freeway traffic, and movie theatre manager Richard M.
Zhlubb, in 1970’s L.A. is completely bewildering. Although biographical details about
Pynchon are as hard to come by as water in the desert, Pynchon’s friends attest in various
interviews and essays that Gravity’s Rainbow was written in a Manhattan Beach
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apartment, across town from where the novel ends (Tse, “Photos: Thomas Pynchon’s
Apartment in Manhattan Beach, the City that Inspired Inherent Vice”).
Pynchon could have ended the book any number of places—even a place like
Camp Pendleton might make more sense considering this is a book chiefly about the final
days of WWII—but Pynchon ends Gravity’s Rainbow in the Orpheus (a slightly
fictionalized iteration of the Orpheum) Theatre amid a lively crowd rapt in anticipation
of…something readers don’t quite grasp even after the novel ends. Like the V-2 rocket at
the center of the novel, cinema exits the atmosphere of clear-cut fiction and re-enters
elsewhere, at a fictionalized version of the actual time and space of the novel’s
composition. That this re-entry occurs in a movie-theatre only highlights cinema’s
importance in the thrust of the narrative, and indeed cinema permeates the entirety of
Pynchon’s text, not only its ending.
The connective function cinema enacts in Gravity’s Rainbow, facilitating the
movement across a multitude of interfaces participates in the concept of media ecology.
In addition to the ideas about media ecology as a confrontation with the systems
individuals are a part of and circulate within, media ecology is also a concept that
addresses a particular valence of transformation. Matthew Fuller’s book Media Ecology
sets the course for his writing about the term thus: “objects here should also be
understood to mean processes embodied as objects, as elements in a composition. Every
element is an explosion, a passion or capacity settled temporarily into what passes for a
stable state” (Fuller 1). Media ecology’s relation to actual scientific or biological ecology
is admittedly metaphorical. Fuller acknowledges that the

!128
term ‘ecology’ is used here because it is one of the most expressive language has
to indicate the massive and dynamic interrelation of processes and objects, beings
and things, patterns and matter…‘Media ecology,’ or more often ‘information
ecology,’ is deployed as a euphemism for the allocation of informational roles in
organizations and in computer supported collaborative work…Of keen interest
too in such contexts is how information flows are routed within an organization.
(Fuller 2-3)
Although the term may be a “euphemism” or metaphor, Fuller’s and López’s use of
media ecology is by no means a corruption of ecology as such.
Manuel De Landa argues that where ecology is concerned, “In many respects, the
circulation is what matters, not the particular forms that it causes to emerge” (De Landa
104). This is the ecological context in which to read what cinema does in Gravity’s
Rainbow. Certainly cinema has the capacity to hold a form, which opens it up to control
or violence, or any of the trappings that critics usually highlight. But regardless, cinema
is for better or worse, in the business of transformation—the cinema circulates
information, plots, characters, objects, and fantasies from one setting to another. De
Landa goes on to say that, “the emergence of an eco-system is typically described as a
succession of plant assemblages that interact with each other, passing through several
stable states until they reach a ‘climax’” (De Landa 105). Incidentally, one could say
nearly the exact same thing to describe cinema instead of an ecosystem—that any given
still image will appear to be a stable state (i.e. a photograph), but is actually part of a
chain of succession. Pynchon’s novel ends as a rocket falls toward an unexpecting
audience clamoring for the projectionist to “Come-on! Start the show!” (760).
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As the rocket falls and readers finish the book, we realize that actually its impact
occurs during the very first words of the novel when “A screaming comes across the sky.
It has happened before, but there is nothing to compare it to now” (3). The “before” in
this sentence actually means “after” if one is reading the book for the first time, and the
reason that there is no grounds for comparison is because one has presumably not yet
read about any of the rockets launched and detonated later on in the book. But this
ending, which sends readers back across the interface of the book’s physical cover, to the
beginning of the book, is once more facilitated by the cinema. The spectators on the last
page presumably get their wish for the show to start when the first page begins to be read.
There are a lot of things happening here. The novel ends with a transformation from
novel to film, where the apparent stability of each state is perpetually compromised or
transformed by the novel’s end. This transformation aligns cinema’s function within the
novel with what theorists have termed media ecology. But it also opens up a particular
kind of space for thinking about relationships between literature and the cinema. And
about how we think about adaptations.
There is a chapter dedicated to Gravity’s Rainbow and Luigi Piradello’s Shoot! In
a recent book devoted to literature’s relationship with screens called Between Page and
Screen: Remaking Literature Through Cinema and Cyberspace. Lovorka Gruic Grmusa
and Kiene Brillenburg Wurth’s essay, “Cinematography as a Literary Concept in the
(Post)Modern Age: Pirandello to Pynchon” argues that Gravity’s Rainbow uses cinema to
demonstrate the impossibility of non-mediated consciousness and “as a ‘mainstream’
machine” whose potential for artistic expression has been swallowed up by a “cultural
colonization” (195). I would argue that Grmusa and Wurth’s characterization of the
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cinema in Gravity’s Rainbow has actually very little to do with Gravity’s Rainbow. Their
reading is not necessarily unfair or inaccurate, but I think that their conclusions belong in
a context that is much broader than Pynchon’s book.
In fact, the argument that cinema’s potential is only rarely glimpsed amid the
mass-produced and mass-consumed films of Hollywood is one of film theory’s oldest
arguments. Dziga Vertov wrote in 1923 “The cinema of yesterday and today is merely a
commercial affair. Cinema’s path of development has been dictated solely by
considerations of profit, And it’s hardly surprising that the extensive commerce in motion
pictures—illustrations of novels, romances, Pinkerton serials—has dazzled and attracted
production workers” (36). Little changed on this front for the generation of cinephiles
following Vertov’s. According to a hilarious account from Benjamin Péret:
With cinema not only is anything possible, but the marvelous itself is placed
within reach. And yet never have we seen such a disproportion between the
immensity of its possibilities and the mediocrity of its results…[but it has also]
developed into an industry governed by sordid market forces incapable of
distinguishing a work of the mind from a sack of flour. Nothing counts more for a
producer than the return he may get on the millions he has shelled out on some
idiot’s legs, some cretin’s voice. The net result of such an attitude can only be an
interminable series of films devoid of the slightest interest—when they are not,
frankly, odious and stupid—films that skillfully and purposefully set out to
anaesthetize the public. (59)
And in 1958, seven years after Péret ‘s indictment, Luis Buñuel lamented, “In none of the
traditional arts does there exist a disproportion as great as in the cinema between

!131
possibility and realization…Unfortunately the vast majority of current cinemas appear to
have no other mission than this: their screens wallow in the moral and intellectual vacuity
on which the cinema thrives, a cinema that limits itself” (112-3). Even as film theory
became more philosophically complex and pursued discussions on semiotics, politics,
and psychoanalysis, the idea that mainstream cinema criminally disappoints its potential
persists. Near the beginning of his famous book, Psychoanalysis and the Cinema,
Christian Metz extends the relationship between cinema’s commercial endeavors to
comment specifically on audiences’ willingness to have its desires co-opted by the studio
system’s interests: “Let me insist once again, the cinematic institution is not just the
cinema industry (which works to fill cinemas, not to empty them), it is also the mental
machinery—another industry—which spectators ‘accustomed to the cinema’ have
internalised historically and which has adapted them to the consumption of films” (7).
And so rather than a revelation, it should come as absolutely no surprise
whatsoever, let alone a critical insight, that Thomas Pynchon would register cinema’s
capacity to manipulate or “anaesthetize” audiences. And so certainly, cinema
occasionally takes on a nefarious role within Gravity’s Rainbow, but it does so within the
context of a novel that’s all about allowing for all kinds of transformations—not only
between living and dead (a transformation that has been a central concern for film theory
for decades) but also between various states of what cinema can be. The idea the cinema
is a continuously developing and changing art (not unlike other art forms such as the
novel or painting) is concretized among Gravity’s Rainbow’s final sentences. After an
ambiguous technical malfunction, caused perhaps by a burned out lightbulb (recalling the
unforgettable scenes of the book involving Byron the Bulb) or a problem with the film
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strip itself, “in the dark and awful expanse of screen something has kept on, a film we
have not learned to see…it is now a closeup of the face, a face we all know—” (760).
Hand-in-hand with the hopes for new and radical incarnations of the cinema on the part
of the film theorists who see cinema as perpetually infantile, Pynchon ends his book with
an unspecified new kind of film that audiences much catch up with, moving from an
unprecedented cinematic transformation across the interface of the screen into the
experience of the audience, who perhaps must respond to the film (which becomes the
beginning of the book) by learning to see anew.

5.4.

Adaptation

I want to conclude this dissertation in a similar area to where it began, with
theory. I began by thinking about the ways and places where ecological, posthuman, and
animal studies might enter into discussions about film in ways other than representation.
And I would like to end by contributing some theoretical arguments of my own. My
argument is simple: discussions about cinematic adaptation can become more lively by
thinking about adaptation in more Darwinian terms. Thinking about the question of
fidelity in cinematic adaptations, Sergio Rizzo points out that “in moving beyond fidelity
criticism, these scholars leave little room for the concept of ‘infidelity’” (Rizzo 299). One
way to think more (and perhaps better) about adaptations’ infidelity is to consider the
Darwinian sense of the word adaptation. Put crudely, to judge or evaluate a film
adaptation according to how faithful it is to its literary ancestor would be like expecting a
cheetah to swim simply because its ancestors were acquatic. Adaptations are the genetic
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mutations of DNA sequences that produce new traits from one generation to another,
eventually culminating in new species, and according to Evolutionary theory, these
changes are meant to increase an organism’s fitness for a given environment or habitat.
Right in the middle of Stephen Jay Gould’s massive work, The Structure of
Evolutionary Theory, which serves here as my evolutionary guide, Gould includes a
small section titled “A Personal Odyssey” which explains a shift in his thinking about
species selection. Gould justifies this personal writing by pointing out that
[m]any historians of science, particularly feminists like Donna Harraway
(sic)…have forcefully argued that scholars can strike their most effective blows
against the myth of pure objectivism by being candid about the interaction of their
own autobiographies with they current claims—thus exposing the inevitable (and
basically welcome) cultural and psychological embeddedness of science, while
operating an author’s prejudice both to his own scrutiny, and to the examination
of his readers. (Gould 670)
The problem of what Gould calls “pure objectivism” is that although scientific research
attempts to minimize biases in order to garner the most reliable data possible, one must
address acknowledge and confront the very real structural and institutional biases that
inform “unbiased” research. An example here of confronting “the myth of pure
objectivism” would ask why some kinds of research agendas get funding and others do
not. Or one might argue that “unbiased” reseach does not yield “neutral” results—that
scientific findings are often deeply political (research on climate change or species
depopulation, for example.) Gould’s appeal to Haraway’s personal writing, which she
intensifies in “Notes of a Sportswriter’s Daughter”, inserted into Haraway’s work on
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companion species in both The Companion Species Manifesto and When Species Meet,
strikes me as an appropriate place to bridge Pynchon and evolutionary theory. As many
scholars argue, Gravity’s Rainbow is absolutely in the business of striking blows “against
the myth of pure objectivism.” And it is in this spirit of confronting one’s personal biases
and limitations as a scientist, theorist, or writer of any kind that want to make clear that I
am not a biologist and my knowledge of evolution and Darwin does not approach
expertise. My aim here is to simply engage the spirit or sentiment of evolutionary theory
in order to model what an ecocritical or ecocinematic conversation about film adaptations
might look like precisely among those of us who are not ecologists or biologists by
training. After all the whole point of interdisciplinary research, it seems to me, is not to
go around planting the flag of expertise in more and more fields, but to expand the range
and capacities of one’s field—the goal is biodiversity, not colonization.
Although Pynchon does not exactly include his autobiography into either
Gravity’s Rainbow or Inherent Vice—the first of Pynchon’s texts to be adapted into a
film—he does absolutely call attention to the time and place of his novels’ writing, of
their compositional moment in time and space—which is about as much autobiography as
the elusive and mysterious Thomas Pynchon is ever likely to engage. (One could argue
that the introduction to the collection of his short stories, Slow Learner, wades into
autobiographical waters, but it amounts mostly to Pynchon being charmingly critical of
his own early writing.) And because of Pynchon’s notoriously minimal public life, one of
the most frequent points of contention leading up to, and immediately following, the
release of Paul Thomas Anderson’s adaptation of Inherent Vice was the question of
whether Thomas Pynchon would have a cameo appearance on screen. The question is
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irresistible for Pynchon fans. Everyone knows that the only widely available photographs
of Pynchon were taken fifty years ago, long before he became famous.
But in none of the fan-boy obsessing over the question of if or where in
Anderson’s Inherent Vice Pynchon might make a cameo does anyone seem to consider
what it might mean for Pynchon to break his self-imposed prohibition on being
photographed. Despite the fact that the release of the film might represent the moment
Pynchon fans have all been waiting for, no one really seems prepared to respond to
Pynchon’s image. I would argue that Pynchon’s much-rumored and searched-for cameo
in Inherent Vice amounts to a vestigial trait within the body of the film. Pynchon’s
appearance, while serving no clear purpose, is nevertheless a kind of reminder of the
film’s origins.
I want to end by returning to the discussion of the brief scene in Inherent Vice
where two Vietnam vets are involved in travelling the California coast photographing and
documenting environmental damages. At first glance, one might consider this scene as a
part of the representation-based ecocinema I set out to work beyond. Žižek’s insight
about liberation being about more than representation and the “right to narrate” (190)
does, however, discard these concerns—the key phrase is perhaps “not limited to.” What
I find so intriguing about Spike and Farley’s hobby is that the novel, and they, position it
as a noble activity that somehow works against what they did in Vietnam. Whether they
see their eco-documentaries as anti- or de-militaristic is unclear, but their penitent attitude
and the sheepish way Spike refers to his being in Vietnam, makes a stark contrast
between military and ecocinematic activities. I like this moment from the novel so well
because it moves eco-documentary filmmaking into more interesting territory than mere
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eco-advocacy—namely, by positioning ecological filmmaking as a project that works, at
least in principle, against the mentalities that fuelled and motivated the Vietnam war. The
effect here is not just to make things more complicated than they need to be. Žižek’s
point is that representation-based projects, regardless of the liberation they struggle for,
will not take hold unless they do something more than create positive representations.
In many ways this dissertation has been about looking for ways to extend the
scholarly conversation about cinema and Ecocriticism beyond the domain of
representation. I do not mean to simply dismiss concerns over representation; obviously,
as I mentioned in my introduction, I am invested in a diverse cinema. But I remain
somewhat unsatisfied by the simple substitution of animals or the environment into wellworn conversations about marginalization, and so I have looked for opportunities and
openings for different kinds of discussion concerning how film and photography might
address ecology, animals, and the (post)human. This tactic has produced chapters that
vary from each other in terms of their subject matter and so in the future, I see this project
developing into two or more discrete projects. I would, for instance, like to incorporate
more of Thomas Pynchon’s writing into my thoughts about his fiction. Against the Day
might be an important next place for my work to turn, considering the novel is set during
the turn-of-the century, when cinema was still a very new invention. Likewise, I would
like to develop my work with Virilio and De Landa where drones and film are concerned.
My second chapter focuses heavily on Koyaanisqatsi, a film which I treasure, but I would
like to continue writing in the future on the kinds of convergence I pick up on between
Koyaanisqatsi’s style and drones (and what drones represent vis-à-vis militarization.)
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For now, I think I have carved out a few different paths that demonstrate the range
of my interests—including several different eras of film theory, animals, Pynchon, etc.—
but also a commitment to writing about these interests in ways that avoid retreading
popular critical conversations by attempting to think through several ideas or approaches
at once, “lay[ing] everything out…on a single page, the same sheet” (Deleuze and
Guattari 9). The process, of determining not only what to write about, but also of how to
arrange my chapters has been difficult, but in many respects the approaches taken by the
classes I took from my committee members has been a constant encouragement to
continue attempting the project.
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